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Democratizing Platform Privacy
Sari Mazzurco*
The online platform political economy—that is, the interrelationship of economic and political power in the exchange of online
services for personal information—has endowed platforms with
overwhelming power to determine consumers’ information privacy.
Mainstream legal scholarship on information privacy has focused
largely on an economic problem: individual consumers do not obtain their “optimal” level of privacy due to a bevy of market failures.
This Article presents the political issue: that platforms’ hegemonic
control over consumers’ information privacy renders the rules they
impose illegitimate from a democratic perspective. It argues platform hegemony over consumers’ information privacy is a political
problem, in the first instance, due to the social foundations of normative information privacy and the social character of personal information. Although issues affecting society in this manner are typically met with government intervention—through the promulgation
of law—or class-action litigation, neither of these safeguards have
effectively protected consumers’ information privacy. Rather than
empower consumers to determine information privacy norms and
how to protect them, the law’s reliance on platform self-regulation
through notice and consent has empowered platforms to make these
determinations unilaterally.
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Given the government’s failure to regulate effectively the platform political economy, this Article proposes an alternative to
government action. Specifically, this Article contends that the existing private governance of information privacy ought to strive for
democratic legitimacy. This Article draws an analogy between the
platform political economy and the labor political economy of the
early twentieth century and proposes that concepts and mechanisms from industrial democracy, which sought to legitimate workplace decision-making can serve as a toolkit for the legitimation of
information privacy rules.
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INTRODUCTION

In the online platform political economy—that is, the interrelationship of economic and political power in the exchange of online
services for personal information—platforms have overwhelming
power to determine consumers’ online information privacy. Platforms obtain this power through economic and structural forces:
platforms have the economic incentive to extract as much commercial value as possible from personal information and the structural
ability to determine unilaterally what personal information they will
collect, how they will use it, and what protections, if any, they will
provide consumers.1 Individual consumers’ cognitive limitations
and collective action problem magnifies their structural inability to
counter platform power.2 Applicable bodies of information privacy
law entrench platform power insofar as they explicitly or implicitly
rely on industry self-regulation through notice and choice. Hence,
information privacy is relegated to a system of private governance—
albeit hegemonic private governance—in which platforms unilaterally determine the information privacy afforded consumers.3
Viewing the platform political economy as engendering private
governance over information privacy requires a preliminary reorientation—one must first understand information privacy as affecting society and not just individual consumers. The economics-based
individualist paradigm, though helpful in describing platforms’ concentration of power, does little to explain the societal dimensions of
information privacy. It postulates information privacy as a set of individual preferences to be satisfied vis-à-vis market forces. However, the manner in which it cabins information privacy to individual
preferences and actions obscures the societal features of information
1

See infra Section I.A. This Article describes the relationship between platforms and
the people whose personal information they collect as one between platforms and
“consumers.” “Consumer,” albeit, is an imperfect term to describe people’s place in
platforms’ private governance of information privacy insofar as it might suggest a simple
commercial relationship in which a seller and a purchaser exchange goods or services for
valuable consideration. Alternatives, such as “data subject” and “data citizen,” are also
imperfect in different ways. I chose to proceed using the term “consumer” to connote that
the relationship between platforms and people is one arising from a private, commercial
context.
2
See infra Section I.A.
3
See infra Section I.B.
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privacy—that is, the social paradigm, in which information privacy
is determined by and affects society at large. Within the social paradigm of information privacy, platforms’ control over consumers’
information privacy gives rise to a question of political legitimacy:
who ought to determine consumers’ information privacy and how it
ought to be protected?
In the United States, we understand that the rules which affect
society are legitimate when they emerge from democratic procedures—those that enable public participation in community norm
development and the promulgation of corresponding protective
rules.4 Yet, typical democratic processes that protect against collective harms, such as curative legislation, government agency action,
and private litigation have failed to place limits on platforms’ power
over information privacy.5 These bodies of information privacy law
have become so tethered to notice and consent that calls for their
reform and expansion make no attempt to remedy the consumer disenfranchisement brought about by this system of self-regulation.6 In
the absence of government intervention, the private governance of
information privacy lacks democratic legitimacy, as rule-setting
platforms are hegemonic, opaque, and unaccountable to consumers.
This Article proposes that, despite governmental inaction, democratizing private governance may legitimate information privacy
within the existing legal framework. Just as democratic procedures
legitimate political decision-making, information privacy’s private
governance may attain democratic legitimacy when those governed
by platforms’ information privacy rules are able to participate in developing them.
Democratizing the private governance of information privacy
may seem like a radical proposition, insofar as it is difficult to conceptualize a disparate group of consumers counteracting platform
hegemony. However, theories of industrial democracy—which
introduced the notion of democratic political legitimacy to decisionmaking in the labor political economy—provide an interesting
starting point to envision democratic platform information privacy.
4
5
6

See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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The concept of democratizing labor’s private governance by
empowering workers took hold at the turn of the twentieth century,
when employer hegemony over the terms and conditions of
unskilled workers’ labor characterized the labor political economy,
much like today’s platform-consumer relationship.7 Proponents of
industrial democracy viewed worker collective bargaining organizations, i.e., unions, as a centerpiece of democratic private governance.8 In their ideal type, unions democratized workplace decisionmaking on three levels: internal, through their democratic formation
and operation; procedural, through accumulating bargaining power
counter to employers; and contractual, through entering bargaining
agreements that determine labor conditions and hold employers
accountable.
Existing scholarship has conceived of a relationship between
data (more broadly than personal information) and labor, arguing
generally that users’ production of data is akin to labor that ought to
be compensated and users ought to form unions to negotiate for just
compensation.9 This Article takes no position on whether consumers’ use of platforms amounts to compensable labor. Rather, it argues that labor provides a fruitful analogy to platform information
privacy as both share similarly hegemonic political economies. Accordingly, industrial democracy can frame the democratic legitimation of information privacy. As in the labor context, collective action—here, on the part of consumers—ought to be a feature central
to consumer enfranchisement with respect to information privacy.
However, platform democracy will be characteristically different
than industrial democracy: the platform political economy’s unique
7

See, e.g., SYDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, at vi
(1897); JOHN H. GREENWOOD, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TRADE UNIONISM 13 (1911).
8
See, e.g., WEBB & WEBB, supra note 7, at 3–37 (describing primitive democracy of
labor through trade unionism).
9
Authors supporting a “labor” theory of the market for personal information have
drawn the comparison to advocate for payments to Internet users for their “data labor.” See,
e.g., Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 660
(2015) (citation omitted); Imanol Arieta Ibarra et al., Should We Treat Data as Labor? One
Hundred and Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 108 AM.
ECON. ASS’N PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 38, 39 (2018); Should Internet Firms Pay for the
Data Users Currently Give Away?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/01/11/should-internet-firmspay-for-the-data-users-currently-give-away [https://perma.cc/B55C-TCM2].
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features, the organization of social life online, and consumers’ understanding of their information privacy suggest collective bargaining in this context warrants certain departures and adaptations from
industrial democracy’s model.
I.

THE PLATFORM POLITICAL ECONOMY & THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
OF INFORMATION PRIVACY

The Internet today is, in large part, a medium through which
consumers share vast amounts of personal information while making purchases, consuming news and entertainment media, and communicating with friends—among other activities. The online platforms that provide these services and collect, process, and analyze
consumers’ personal information in exchange have achieved tremendous financial success, largely by leveraging “insights” from
consumer data sets to sell third parties advertising services.10 The
economics and structure of this data trade have imbued platforms
with significant power to determine and diminish consumers’ information privacy. In the face of platforms’ power, individual consumers are effectively unable to protect their information privacy: they
face cognitive limitations that impede them from taking information
privacy protective actions and a collective action problem that impairs their ability to extract additional information privacy protections from platforms.11 Existing information privacy law blesses
platforms’ control of information privacy: as long as platforms provide accurate notice of their data-handling practices and honor consumer choices—when platforms elect to provide choices—they are
free to decide consumers’ information privacy.
Mainstream legal scholarship regarding online information privacy has focused on the market’s failure to provide individual consumers their desired level of privacy. Additionally, it has largely
overlooked the political nature of platforms’ power to decide information privacy regulation. There is, however, an emerging body of
scholarship, including the works of Julie Cohen, Paul Schwartz, and
Shoshana Zuboff, that focuses on the political aspects of information
10

See JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 37 (2019).
11
See infra notes 25–45 and accompanying text.

OF

798

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792

privacy.12 In short, platforms’ power over information privacy is political due to the social foundations of information privacy and the
social character of personal information. This power—to decide and
grant, privately and unilaterally, information privacy—has enabled
and supported platforms’ private governance over a sector of society. In this context, platforms’ overwhelming and unchecked power
over consumers calls into question their information privacy rules’
political legitimacy.
A. The Platform Political Economy
Platforms’ economics and structure have endowed them with the
incentive and ability to determine unilaterally the extent of their personal information collection and use and, concomitantly, consumers’ privacy with respect to that information. In this political economy, though consumers both consume the platforms’ products (i.e.,
advertising and, among other things, a social network, search
engine, or marketplace) and supply resources that enable their provision (i.e., their personal information), they are unable to shape
platforms’ rules that affect their information privacy.13 Without
legal limitations on platforms’ power, hegemonic platforms’
12

See COHEN, supra note 10; see generally Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Julie E. Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 241 (2012); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform
Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy
in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (1999) [hereinafter “Privacy and Democracy in
Cyberspace”]; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815
(1999) [hereinafter “Internet Privacy and the State”]; SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019).
13
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127
(2000) (citation omitted); THE ECONOMIST, supra note 9; Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand
Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW.
U. L. REV. 63, 132 (2003); Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs
of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 102 (2002); Shaun B. Spencer,
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 845, 891,
898–99 (2002) (citation omitted). But see Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (2000) (noting commenters suggest transaction
costs for individual consumer negotiation with platforms will be so low that individuals
will be able to reach individualized bargains over their privacy); see generally Daniel D.
Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of the Self in the
Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69 (2006) (arguing individual consumers have
bargaining power such that they should be expected to negotiate for their privacy).
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information privacy rules lack political legitimacy in our democratic
legal tradition.
Platforms have powerful incentives to collect and process as
much personal information as they can obtain; for many of these
businesses, consumer personal information has become a key commercial asset useful in large part to sell advertising.14 The tremendous revenues produced by harvesting personal information have
rendered the data trade a sort of “new economy”;15 one in which
information is in constant supply and acquired by platforms at nearzero cost.16 The profits available in this economy have unsurprisingly led to even more businesses and technologies entering and
coming to depend on it.17 The near-zero cost to obtain personal information may be attributed to the economic conditions of platforms’ exchange with consumers. Many platforms provide consumers with “free” services, which generate and collect consumer
personal information as a “by-product” of using the service.18 Thus,
consumers obtain a service for free that they ostensibly value at an
above-zero cost, while platforms incur the comparatively small cost

14

See, e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 12; Samuelson, supra note 13, at 1126 (citation
omitted); Anne de Hingh, Some Reflections on Dignity as an Alternative Legal Concept in
Data Protection, 19 GERMAN L.J. 1269, 1270, 1278 (2018); Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor,
Opinion 4/2015: Towards a New Digital Ethics, Data, Dignity and Technology, at 6 (Sept.
11, 2015) [hereinafter “Opinion 4/2015”]; Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data
in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 428 (2018) (citation omitted);
Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 41; COHEN, supra note 10, at 38, 42; Joshua A.T. Fairfield &
Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 429–31 (2015); Spencer,
supra note 13, at 898.
15
See de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1270–71 (citation omitted); Opinion 4/2015, supra
note 14, at 8; Elvy, supra note 14, at 435 (citation omitted). For example, “Facebook’s
‘maneuverings to get [users] to open up’ have led to soaring advertising revenue, with
advertising revenue of $3.8 billion in 2011, up from $1.86 billion in 2010.” Nicole A. Ozer,
Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social Movement and Creating
Corporate Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 238 (2012) (citation omitted).
16
See Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 41.
17
See Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 70 (citation omitted); Olivier Sylvain, The Market for
User Data, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1087, 1097 (2019).
18
See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 102, 111, 130 (2000-2001); Barnhizer, supra note 13, at
98-99 (citations omitted); Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 38; COHEN, supra note 10, at 38–
44; Ozer, supra note 15, at 226 (internal citation omitted) (noting the “zero price effect”
suggests consumers perceive “free” items as more valuable than they actually are).
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of providing the service and obtain enormously profitable personal
information from consumers as a result.19
This exchange, however, incents over-collection of personal
information because it does not capture the relationship between
personal information collection and use and information privacy.
The collection and use of some personal information come at a cost
to information privacy.20 For example, collecting a person’s geolocation when she is at an HIV clinic likely undermines her expectation of privacy. But platforms that rely financially on acquiring and
analyzing personal information incur an opportunity cost (i.e., lost
potential profits) when providing information privacy protections
that limit the personal information they may collect and how they
may use it.21 Information about the consumer’s location at the HIV
clinic enables the platform to target her for antiretroviral drugs,
making its advertising services more valuable to pharmaceutical
companies. If the platform abstains from collecting or using this information, it loses the opportunity to obtain the associated advertising profits. Platforms, however, need not bear this opportunity cost
as consumers routinely fail to “internalize” the cost to their information privacy in dollars and cents.22 The clinic visitor, even if
aware of the harm to her information privacy, is unlikely to reduce
that harm to a monetary sum to then factor into the value she receives from the “free” service. Without consumers factoring information privacy costs into their decisions to engage, platforms bear
less than their actual costs and thus have the incentive to collect an

19
See, e.g., Hetcher, supra note 18, at 102; Steven A. Hetcher, Changing the Social
Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 167 (2001) (citation
omitted) [hereinafter “Changing the Social Meaning”]; de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1278;
COHEN, supra note 10, at 41.
20
See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 424 (2003).
21
See, e.g., Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 174–98; Jeff Sovern, Opting
In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74
WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1081–83 (1999).
22
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of
Willpower Norms, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1235, 1287–88 (2005); DIRK BERGEMANN &
ALESSANDRO BONATTI, THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL DATA 3, 5 (2019); Ozer, supra note 15,
at 227.
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excess of personal information and under-provide information
privacy protections.23
The structure of the online platform environment endows platforms with the ability to determine unilaterally the extent of their
personal information collection and use and consumers’ attendant
information privacy. Consumers have little choice over what information they will reveal about themselves.24 Some information is disclosed automatically through web browsers25 and consumers must
provide other information due to platforms’ design.26 The amount of
personal information collected, and how it is used and shared, is the
platforms’ choice—platforms present these conditions to consumers

23

See Calo, supra note 9, at 659 (citation omitted); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note
13, at 102; Spencer, supra note 13, at 891, 897–98 (citation omitted). For this opportunity
cost to be in the platform’s interest economically, it would have to be offset, perhaps by
increased consumer participation (and therefore additional usable personal information) or
better-quality information. See Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 201.
Though offering privacy protections personalized to the individual consumer may reduce
the potential revenue reduction, this “privacy price discrimination” will nonetheless entail
an additional expense the platform would seek to offset. See Litman, supra note 13, at
1298; Spencer, supra note 13, at 891 (citation omitted).
24
See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 65 (2003). Commenters writing in the early 2000s have expressed a counterview
that consumers can take privacy protective actions by choosing to engage with privacy
respecting websites and not engage with others, providing errant websites false information
or stirring gossip about their practices, employing ad blockers, and blocking cookies,
among other things. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, The De Facto Federal Privacy
Commission, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 109, 129 (2000) [hereinafter “De
Facto Federal Privacy”]; Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 159–60;
Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of Online
Consumer Information, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95, 145 (2019); Hetcher, supra note 18, at
114, 130; Spencer, supra note 13, at 894; McClurg, supra note 13, at 131–32. To be sure,
some consumers engage in this kind of self-help. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., The
Economics of Privacy, 54(2) J. ECON. LIT. 442, 447 (2016). For example, consumers
sometimes pay a premium to purchase goods from more privacy protective merchants and
teens have adopted a variety of strategies to engage online while protecting their privacy.
Id. However, arguments that individual self-help suffices fail to appreciate the constrictive
political economy consumers face with respect to online privacy (and some older
arguments are based on an outdated view of the Internet).
25
See Savage, supra note 24, at 101.
26
See, e.g., Calo, supra note 9, at 661, 662 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13,
at 894, 900 (citations omitted); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of
Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2036 (2013).
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on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.27 Even those platforms that provide
consumers tools to opt in or opt out of various data-handling practices offer a highly circumscribed degree of “control” that may not
accurately reflect consumers’ desires. The clinic visitor may deny
a platform permission to collect her geolocation, yet the platform
may nevertheless discover the clinic visitor’s location if she
accesses the HIV clinic’s Wi-Fi network. Particularly where
platforms share consumers’ personal information with third parties,
such as service providers, data brokers, and advertisers, consumers
are left unaware of the parties who obtain their information and lack
any direct relationship with them, thereby precluding any semblance
of “control.”28 Moreover, even if an individual consumer opts out of
a platform’s information collection or “exits” the platform, the
platform can still derive information about her from third parties,
including other consumers, other websites via web trackers, and
data brokers.29 Overall, the magnitude of platforms’ control over
personal information collection, use, and sharing normalizes platforms’ over-collection of personal information and under-provision
of information privacy protections, to the point that consumers
believe they are inevitable conditions of using platform services.30
Moreover, an individual consumer’s threat to exit, or actual exit,
from a platform imposes negligible costs on the platform and is thus
unlikely to compel a platform to change its information privacy
rules. Platforms typically derive value from consumers’ personal
information by aggregating it over time, across consumers, and from
various third parties—ultimately building comprehensive profiles
27

See Savage, supra note 24, at 101, 106–07; Spencer, supra note 13, at 901; Paul M.
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2081–82
(2004).
28
See, e.g., Elvy, supra note 14, at 444–45; McClurg, supra note 13, at 136; Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1269, 1270 (2005); Acquisti et al., supra note 24, at 447; James A. Rothchild, Against
Notice and Choice: The Manifest Failure of the Proceduralist Paradigm to Protect Privacy
Online (or Anywhere Else), 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 563, 582 (2018).
29
See also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 823, 827; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at
411 (citation omitted); Elvy, supra note 14, at 444 (citation omitted); Acquisti et al., supra
note 24, at 464 (citation omitted); Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563, 582; Savage, supra
note 24, at 106-07.
30
Strahilevitz, supra note 26, at 2036 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at 844,
860, 863, 865 (citation omitted); COHEN, supra note 10, at 45.
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that predict consumer behavior.31 In the process of collecting information, each individual bit of information is far less valuable than it
is in the aggregate, especially when the platform already has a comprehensive profile of the consumer.32 Additionally, the cost an individual consumer incurs from exiting a platform far exceeds any privacy gain she could achieve. Platforms have become essential and
ubiquitous to consumers’ daily lives. When a platform has a monopoly over a particular service or is supported by network effects,
consumers are unable to exit without impairing their participation
in commerce or social life.33 For a consumer, the cost of exit is
concrete. By contrast, the privacy gain is both difficult to value (in
part because it may not be reducible to dollars and cents) but also
likely minimal, in light of platforms’ ability to obtain much of a
consumer’s personal information regardless of her exit.34
Individual consumers lack the economic and structural foundations of power to protect their information privacy. Behavioral economists note that consumers face cognitive limitations—including information asymmetry, inter-temporal decision-making difficulty,
and bounded rationality—and a collective action problem that limit
significantly their individual bargaining power.35 Individual consumers’ practical inability to protect their information privacy and
the social foundations of information privacy, discussed later, suggest that consumer communities, rather than individual consumers,
ought to play a greater role in protecting information privacy.
First, whereas platforms know what personal information they
collect about any given consumer and how they use it, consumers

31

ZUBOFF, supra note 12.
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 9; BERGEMANN & BONATTI, supra note 22, at 6; Hahn &
Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 104 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at 897
(citations omitted).
33
COHEN, supra note 10, at 39, 43; Spencer, supra note 13, at 901; Hahn & LayneFarrar, supra 13, at 115; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 9.
34
Spencer, supra note 13, at 897.
35
Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183, 1227 (2016); Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1288; Property, Privacy, and
Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2078, 2080; Acquisti, et al., supra note 24, at 448;
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822; Spencer, supra note 13, at 845.
32
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generally do not have access to that knowledge.36 Platforms typically provide privacy notices that ostensibly describe their collection, use, and sharing practices, but these notices often contain general terms that obscure the platform’s practices and, moreover, do
not apply to third parties with whom they share consumer information.37 Platforms may also come to use consumers’ personal information in ways they cannot predict.38 Second, many consumers
rationally fail to read privacy notices presented to them.39 By one
estimate, it would take 244 hours for the average Internet user to
read all of the privacy notices presented to her in a given year.40
Beyond the “notice fatigue” she would experience by attempting to
read all of these notices, the opportunity cost of actually engaging
in this effort would render the attempt irrational.41 The value she
36
Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 203–04; Strandburg, supra note 22,
1302; de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1271–72; Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A
Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 368 (2006); Nehf, supra
note 24, at 62; Rothchild, supra note 28, at 584, 614 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note
13, at 892 (citation omitted); Acquisti et al, supra note 24, at 477.
37
Elvy, supra note 14, at 445 (citation omitted); Lawrence Jenab, Will The Cookie
Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th
Congress, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 641, 667–68 (2001) (citation omitted); McClurg, supra note
13, at 134; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822; Nehf, supra note 24, at 63 (citation omitted);
Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563; Spencer, supra note 13, at 896 (citation omitted).
38
Kenneth Bamberger & Dierdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and On the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 297 (2011); Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case
of Information, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 382 (2012) (citation omitted);
Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 898
(2009).
39
Elvy, supra note 14, at 442 (citation omitted); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy
Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV.
587, 588 (2007) (citation omitted); Priscilla M. Regan, Response to Privacy As a Public
Good, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 51, 52 (2016); Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563; PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED AND FEELING LACK
OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION, 57 (2019) (finding 23% of consumers
often or always read privacy policies before agreeing to them and only 22% of consumers
read all of a privacy policy presented to them).
40
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,
4 I/S: J. OF LAW & POL. 543, 563 (2012). See also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 39,
at 57 (finding 25% of consumers report are asked to agree to a privacy policy on an almost
daily basis, 32% on a roughly weekly basis, and 24% on a roughly monthly basis).
41
Rothchild, supra note 28, at 615–21. Exacerbating this opportunity cost is the fact
privacy notices are continuously updated and consumers would have to check back to stay
up-to-date with a given company’s practices. Id. at 616. Notice fatigue is compounded by
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would gain from this knowledge, considering privacy notices’ general inadequacy, is unlikely to meet or exceed the cost to obtain it.42
Third, it is difficult for consumers to understand how platforms’
data-handling practices affect them, even when they read privacy
notices.43 Consumers generally do not understand the information
privacy consequences of sharing or protecting their personal information and they cannot predict or understand the consequences of
how platforms handle their information.44 Fourth, even if consumers
read and understood the privacy notices presented to them, they generally cannot verify or monitor platforms’ compliance with their
representations about their information privacy rules.45
Consumers’ lack of knowledge exacerbates the difficulty of
making inter-temporal decisions.46 Given consumers’ uncertainty
about the future risks or rewards of providing a given platform their
personal information and the immediate appeal of receiving a good
or service (especially one that is “free”), consumers tend to discount
the possibility and cost of future harm and provide more information

“security fatigue,” i.e., consumers’ inability to make granular privacy choice across the
myriad websites with which they interact regularly. Elvy, supra note 14, at 443–44.
42
Rothchild, supra note 28, at 619–20; Spencer, supra note 13, at 899.
43
Balkin, supra note 35, at 1227; Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 78–79; Elvy, supra note
14, at 442; Haynes, supra note 39, at 588; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1271 (citation
omitted); Calo, supra note 9, at 672; Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563, 616; PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, supra note 39, at 52–53, 57–58 (finding 59% of consumers report they understand
very little or nothing about what companies are doing with the data they collect about them
and 32% of consumers report they understand the privacy policies they read very little or
not at all).
44
Bellia, supra note 38, at 898; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 390; Acquisti, et
al., supra note 24, at 444; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822 (citation omitted); Rothchild,
supra note 28, at 615; Ozer, supra note 15, at 226, 228 (citation omitted); Elvy, supra note
14, at 486 (citation omitted); Balkin, supra note 35, at 1200 (citation omitted). Advocacy
organizations have made efforts to inform the public about the effect of website datahandling practices on consumer privacy in order to alleviate this source of asymmetry.
Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 162.
45
Balkin, supra note 35, at 1227; Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27,
at 2079; McClurg, supra note 13, at 134; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1275; Hahn & LayneFarrar, supra note 13, at 114.
46
Edward J. Janger, Locating the Regulation of Data Privacy and Data Security, 5
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97, 105 (2010) (citation omitted).
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than they would prefer in the long term.47 Moreover, under conditions of “bounded rationality,” i.e., “the fact that humans face limitations in the time they have available to gather information and in
their cognitive abilities to process the information in order to arrive
at a utility-maximizing decision,”48 consumers will likely accept
whatever information privacy terms a platform presents to them,
rather than attempt to bargain over the terms presented or create their
own terms.49
In addition to consumers’ cognitive limitations, free-riding and
a collective action problem hinder individual consumers from bargaining with platforms over their information privacy terms. Information privacy is a public good: that is, whatever privacy there is
among members of a community is inherently available to all, and
one person’s “consumption” of privacy does not reduce the privacy
available to others.50 Individuals, however, incur costs to adopt and
maintain a level of privacy. In an online platform setting, producing
information privacy may require a consumer to demand that a platform adopt certain protections benefitting the whole consumer community. In this bargaining effort, the individual consumer incurs a
cost, perhaps to form and communicate demands on the platform or
to withhold her participation on the platform (and thus her supply of
personal information and advertising consumption) until the platform concedes.51 But the individual has a great incentive to “free
ride,” i.e., to obtain the benefit without incurring the cost, because

47
Regan, supra note 39, at 52; Savage, supra note 24, at 98; Ozer, supra note 15, at 226
(citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1265–66, 1286 (citation omitted); Acquisti
et al., supra note 24, at 447; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 391; Spencer, supra note
13, at 898 (citations omitted).
48
Rothchild, supra note 28, at 619 (citation omitted).
49
Spencer, supra note 13, at 900 (citation omitted); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822–23
(citation omitted); Janger, supra note 46, at 105–06 (citation omitted); Schwartz, supra
note 27, at 2081 (citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1238–39 (citation
omitted).
50
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2084–85 (citation omitted); Fairfield & Engel, supra note
14, at 418–19, 423 (citation omitted); De Facto Federal Privacy, supra note 24, at 120,
131 (citation omitted); Hetcher, supra note 18, at 126.
51
Spencer, supra note 13, at 900; see, e.g., Jennifer Huddleston, Preserving
Permissionless Innovation in Federal Data Privacy Policy, 22 NO. 12 J. INTERNET L. 1, 24
(2019) (citation omitted) (“[O]ne study finds that Facebook users would need to be paid up
to $1,000 to leave the service for one year.”).
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once another consumer obtains the information privacy standard
for the community, she need not incur any cost to benefit from it.52
This incentive to free ride gives rise to a collective action problem53
that impedes consumers from acting individually to demand that the
platform provide greater protections.54 That is, though consumers
would benefit from greater information privacy protections, they
will fail to take individual actions to achieve these protections
because each individual would choose to free ride rather than incur
the cost to act in the group’s collective interest.55
B. A Legally Ratified System of Self-Regulation
Applicable information privacy law, composed of sector-specific federal and state statutes, highly circumscribed common law,
and limited agency action, has largely relegated information privacy
to industry self-regulation and otherwise done little to regulate platforms’ collection, use, and disclosure of consumers’ personal information.56 These bodies of law entrench platforms’ dominance over
information privacy insofar as they rely on individual autonomy and
control57 in a platform political economy in which individuals are
politically powerless.
52

Spencer, supra note 13, at 900–01.
De Facto Federal Privacy, supra note 24, at 120; Hetcher, supra note 18, at 115, 126;
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822–23 (citation omitted); Hetcher, supra note 28, at 1274–75;
Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1286–87.
54
Privacy Norms, supra note 18, at 116; Savage, supra note 24, at 111 (citation
omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at 891, 900 (citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note
22, at 1247; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2079.
55
Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 387, 425 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note
13, at 900; Regan, supra note 39, at 54 (citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note 22, at
1247–48 (citation omitted).
56
Hetcher, supra note 18, at 97–98 (citation omitted); Samuelson, supra note 13, at 1131
(noting privacy laws generally do not recognize consumers’ rights to exert control over
their personal information); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 827 (noting privacy laws do not
provide individuals a general right to access their personal information).
57
Elvy, supra note 14, at 430; Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 38, at 258–59 (citation
omitted); Jenab, supra note 37, at 657, 660 (citation omitted); McClurg, supra note 13, at
90 (citation omitted); Haynes, supra note 39, at 611 (quoting Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy
Self-Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (Mar. 4, 2005),
http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UVR8-B3V5];
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 854; Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 111 (citation
omitted); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data
53
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Federal and state information privacy statutes ratify platform
self-regulation through a notice and consent framework. The
Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, for example, each contain exceptions to their respective limitations when the covered entity obtains an individual’s consent.58
State laws mirror the notice-and-consent approach:59 even the
California Consumer Privacy Act, lauded as a major advance in
consumer information privacy protection, requires covered entities
to provide consumers only notice of their data-handling practices
and limited opt-out choices.60
Common law—particularly in tort, contract, and property—also
broadly excepts from liability acts undertaken pursuant to notice and
consent. Tort liability for certain invasions of privacy depends on
whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy.61
But, if a platform-defendant presented the plaintiff-consumer with
an accurate privacy notice, it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff
to have a different expectation of privacy.62 Moreover, the plaintiff’s
consent to the defendant’s practice would eviscerate her tort claim.63
Property and contract law, likewise, sanction actions undertaken
with an ostensibly harmed individual’s consent.64
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2273 (2015); Nehf, supra note 24, at 48 (citation
omitted).
58
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.; Privacy
Rule, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. pt. 160,
164(A), 164(E); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq.; Haynes, supra note
39, at 597–99 (citation omitted); Nehf, supra note 24, at 6, 46, 58.
59
Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 36, at 401; Bellia, supra note 38, at 885.
60
Haynes, supra note 39, at 601–02 (citations omitted); Delaware Online Privacy and
Protection Act, 6 Del. Code § 1201C, et seq.; California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100, et seq.
61
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D, 652E (1965).
62
See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2019); In re
Nw. Airlines Priv. Litig., No. Civ.04–126, 2004 WL 1278459, at *5 (D. Minn. 2004);
Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. CV–10–63, 2011 WL 1842859, at *2 (D. Mont. 2011); In
re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 846 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
63
Elvy, supra note 14, at 486 (citation omitted); McClurg, supra note 13, at 70, 128–29
(noting tort law’s respect for consent protects personal freedom and autonomy).
64
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 275, 284, 287 (1981); see, e.g., Cenna v.
United States, 402 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1968) (stating Pennsylvania conversion law is
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Finally, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has explicitly
relied on industry self-regulation through notice and consent.65
The Commission has focused its enforcement related to information
privacy on businesses’ misrepresentations or failure to follow their
privacy notices and honor consumer choice (deemed “deceptive”)
and misuse of personal information without providing any privacy
notice (deemed “unfair”).66 Hence, businesses need only provide
accurate disclosures of their practices and honor consumer choice,
when they decide to provide choices, to mitigate the risk of FTC
enforcement.
Proponents of notice and choice generally laud its promotion of
individual autonomy and control.67 The platform political economy,
“the deprivation of another’s right of property . . . without the owner’s consent and without
lawful justification.”); In re Gen. Plastics Corp. 184 B.R. 996, 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(“There can be no conversion where a person consents to the possession by another of the
assets allegedly converted.”).
65
Through its authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC
has broad authority to police “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
66
Haynes, supra note 39, at 599–600, 603–04 (citing In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc.,
140 F.T.C. 465 (2005)); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. ToySmart.com, LLC, No. Civ.A. 00–
CV11341RGS, 2000 WL 1523287 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000); In re Vision I Props., LLC,
139 F.T.C. 296, 302 (2005); In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 457 (2004);
In re Educ. Rsch. Ctr. of Am., Inc., 135 F.T.C. 578, 596 (2003); In re GeoCities 127 F.T.C.
94, 1999 FTC LEXIS 17, at *11 (1999); Terrell McSweeny, FTC 2.0: Keeping Pace with
Online Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1027, 1036–37 (2017) (citing FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PRIV. & DATA SEC. UPDATE: 2016 at 2–5 (Jan. 2017); Complaint at ¶¶ 13–14, In
the Matter of Twitter, Inc., Fed. Trade Comm’n Matter No. 0923093 (Mar. 2, 2011)
(Docket No. C–4316); Complaint at ¶¶ 17–18, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., Fed. Trade
Comm’n Matter No. 0923184 (July 27, 2012) (Docket No. C–4365); Complaint at ¶ 6, In
the Matter of Google Inc., Fed. Trade Comm’n Matter No. 1023136 (Oct. 13, 2011)
(Docket No. C–4336); Complaint at ¶¶ 6, 16–17, In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., Fed. Trade
Comm’n Matter No. 1323078 (Dec. 23, 2014) (Docket No. C-4501)) (describing cases
against Twitter, Snapchat, and others alleging misrepresentations about privacy practices);
Calo, supra note 9, at 683 (citation omitted); Steven A. Hetcher, The FTC as Internet
Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2042–43, 2057 (2000) (citations
omitted); Elvy, supra note 14, at 485 (citations omitted); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 628–
29 (2014).
67
Hetcher, supra note 18, at 102, 130; Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at
169; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 408–09 (describing dominance of privacy-ascontrol theory and critiquing individual-focused education and empowerment as somewhat
ineffective); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 820–22, 825 (asserting privacy-as-control must
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however, unmoors notice and choice from the prospect that it gives
consumers autonomy over their personal information. Instead,
notice and choice likely exploit individual consumer vulnerability
with respect to information privacy. Platforms are legally sanctioned
to determine what, if any, information privacy protections they will
provide and consumers are expected to exercise the options platforms afford them, rather than to determine what protections and
options ought to be provided in the first instance. Individual
consumer consent or, more accurately, acquiescence to platforms’
data-handling practices does not reflect consumer “autonomy” or

allow meaningful choice); de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1280 (describing notice and choice
solutions as focused on individual autonomy); Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 4, 11–12
(describing the European model which seeks to empower individual consumers with
greater control). A deep discursion into the relative merits and pitfalls of relying on noticeand-choice frameworks for privacy protections is beyond the scope of this Article. There
is extensive debate on this matter, generally centered on whether consent mechanisms
ought to be opt-in or opt-out. Sovern, supra note 21, at 1083, 1090, 1094, 1101–02 (arguing
opt-out is ineffective in light of bargaining power imbalance); Savage, supra note 24, at
1040 (arguing notice is inadequate in light of its unilateral determination by the particular
business); Nehf, supra note 24, at 63, 67–68 (noting business incentives to make vague and
limited commitments in privacy notices and indicating preference for opt-in over opt-out
consent); Ozer, supra note 15, at 225–26, 240 (asserting greater transparency will lead to
consumers better understanding privacy risks and taking more privacy protective actions);
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 98–101, 146–50 (evaluating arguments in favor of
opt-in consent regime and stating consumers’ failure to act on opt-out opportunities reveals
their preference for the particular transaction); Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 12 (noting
the volume of online activity places the notion of consent under strain); Rothchild, supra
note 28, at 562–63, 608–11, 613–14 (describing failure of notice-and-choice model of
privacy protection but nonetheless advocating for a privacy framework that affords
individual consumers control over their personal information); Solove & Hoofnagle, supra
note 36, at 368–70, 403 (advocating for notice and consent and arguing consumer choice
is only meaningful where consumers have sufficient knowledge of businesses’ datahandling practices); Elvy, supra note 14, at 433–35, 441–45, 466–67, 475, 486–87, 516,
518 (arguing against notice and choice); Haynes, supra note 39, at 593, 596–97 (noting
privacy notices bind the consumer vis-à-vis consent rather than the website operator); de
Hingh, supra note 14, at 1274, 1278–79 (critiquing reliance on notice and consent); Litman,
supra note 13, at 1310–11 (supporting notice and meaningful consent mechanisms);
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2103–06 (supporting opt-in over opt-out consent), 1272–74;
Spencer, supra note 13, at 910–11 (advocating for opt-in consent and better notice);
Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1303–04 (supporting opt-in consent and customized privacy
plans that allow more granular choice); Jenab, supra note 37, at 642–43, 664, 666, 668–69
(supporting notice and consent).
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“control”68 in light of platforms’ ability to determine unilaterally
consumers’ information privacy.
C. The Individualist Paradigm and The Social Paradigm of
Information Privacy
Much privacy scholarship has focused on consumers’ inability
to protect their information privacy in terms of market forces: consumers’ cognitive limitations prevent them from receiving a marketoptimal level of information privacy.69 In line with existing information privacy law, framing information privacy in terms of a market allocation relies on an individualist paradigm. This paradigm
characterizes information privacy as an individual’s control over the
guarding or disclosure of her personal information, which requires
others to respect the secrecy of the information she has chosen to
guard.70 The individualist paradigm certainly helps frame the
68
Savage, supra note 24, at 107, 109; Sovern, supra note 21, at 1094 (noting consumer
acquiescence when opt-out consent is available is unlikely to reflect actual preferences);
Ozer, supra note 15, at 225 (quoting Priscilla M. Regan, Associate Professor, Geo. Mason
Univ., Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association:
Privacy as a Common Good in the Digital World (1999) (“[P]eople are less likely to make
choices that protect their privacy unless these choices are relatively easy, obvious, and low
cost.”).
69
Acquisti, et al., supra note 24, at 448 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at
891 (citation omitted); Ozer, supra note 15, at 226, 231; Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1239,
1285–86, 1288 (citation omitted); Savage, supra note 24, at 109 (citation omitted); Calo,
supra note 9, at 662 (citation omitted); Regan, supra note 39, at 52 (citation omitted);
BERGEMANN & BONATTI, supra note 22, at 5; Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 40 (citation
omitted).
70
Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 169–70 (arguing online privacy
requires websites to abstain from collecting and using personal information except to the
extent the consumer consents to the collection and use); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 820
(describing privacy as control); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 101–02 (describing
belief that information privacy is a personal right pursuant to which individuals should be
allowed to act in their own best interests with respect to guarding or alienating their
personal information); Bergelson, supra note 20, at 402 (explaining control paradigm
places the individual at the center of decision-making regarding the use of her personal
information); Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 12 (“Control is necessary but not
sufficient.”); Baron, supra note 38, at 392 (describing privacy as control); Changing the
Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 167 (noting an extreme view, with respect to information
privacy, is “the less that personal data is collected and used, the better”) (citation omitted);
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 828; Nehf, supra note 24, at 9, 35. C.f. Robert Post, Rereading
Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV 647,
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platform political economy, insofar as it describes why individual
consumers are politically powerless against platforms that decide
consumers’ information privacy. However, in the context of privacy
protection, this paradigm focuses on satisfying individual preferences—however an individual sets the metes and bounds of permissions and limitations with respect to information about her. This
characterization of information privacy, sounding in data protection,
ought not be confused with normative information privacy; that is,
social norms concerning personal information.71 The social foundations of normative information privacy, and the social character of
personal information—the social paradigm of privacy—recast consumers’ inability to protect their information privacy as a political,
rather than economic, problem. The question of how to correct a
failure in the market for information privacy does not answer the
political question of who ought to determine what information
privacy entails and how it ought to be protected. Rather, democratic
theory suggests consumers should have a role in developing information privacy norms and the rules that protect them.
To be sure, individuals have particular preferences with respect
to their privacy—to some, a portrait photograph may not personally
offend, whereas to others, it may. But in either case, privacy’s social
construction gives these preferences meaning. Understanding portrait photography as a practice that implicates privacy derives from
shared expectations, intuitions, and standards of respect. In the context of privacy torts, Professor Robert Post describes privacy norms
as comprising “rules of civility” that constitute individuals and community.72 Privacy takes shape in the forms of respect individuals

651 (1991) (quoting Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198,
206 (1890)) (noting Warren & Brandeis’s privacy torts center on individual control).
71
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 3 (2019); Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV.
957, 963–64 (1989).
72
Post, supra note 71, at 959; Post, supra note 70, at 652; see also Spencer, supra note
13, at 853–54 (describing Post’s “civility rules”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1167 (2004) (describing
Post’s “civility rules” as well as similar ideas in Warren and Brandeis’s article The Right
to Privacy). Per Professor Post, privacy norms provide the basis for “dignitary privacy,”
i.e., privacy rules that “follow[] a normative logic designed to prevent harm to personality
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owe one another as members of the same community.73 The identities of both the individual and the community are, in some part,
shaped by the observance of the community’s privacy norms.74
Information privacy norms are constituted no differently than
are privacy norms more generally; they are formed by common
expectations regarding what personal information ought to be shared
and how it ought to be used in different contexts and circumstances.75 Further, information privacy norms shape individual and
community identity by ascribing meaning to various social practices.76 An individual “receives” information privacy when these
norms are observed with respect to her personal information.77
An intrusion on information privacy, by contrast, injures the individual’s social personality and, when societally pervasive, leads
to erosion of the norm.78 Preservation of information privacy,
however, does not require norms to be fixed or uniform: as with any
social norms, information privacy norms are characteristically nonuniversal, deeply contextual, and constantly in flux.79
caused by the violation of civility rules.” Robert Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy:
Google Spain, The Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67
DUKE L.J. 981, 982 (2018) [hereinafter “Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy”]. This
contrasts with “data privacy,” i.e., those privacy rules that “operate[] according to an
instrumental logic, . . . seek[] to endow persons with ‘control’ over their personal data,”
and may be violated regardless of any showing of harm. Id.
73
Post, supra note 70, at 651; Post, supra note 71, at 985.
74
Post, supra note 70, at 668–69; Post, supra note 71, at 964. See also Spencer, supra
note 13, at 853 (describing Frederick Schauer’s view that the harm underlying privacy torts
is socially constructed).
75
Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1238, 1259; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 423;
Bergelson, supra note 20, at 402; Baron, supra note 38, at 394–95 (applying Post’s “civility
rules” to information privacy); c.f. Savage, supra note 24, at 110 (arguing one individual
can have some privacy even if others do not).
76
C.f. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1270 (describing value of information to community
as well as individual); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 834 (calling information privacy a
“constitutive value” that helps for the society in which we live and shapes individual
identities).
77
Post, supra note 71, at 968.
78
Id. at 964, 966–68.
79
Post, supra note 71, at 984 (describing socially determined variability of social norms,
such as the character of the social occasion and the characteristics of the disclosure and
recipient of information); Savage, supra note 24, at 109 (citation omitted) (describing
scholars’ assertion that “privacy” describes a range of shifting and context-dependent
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Consider a religious group as a type of community with shared
expectations, meanings, and norms. One religious group’s information privacy norms may encourage the dissemination of information about its rites and rituals, but another religious group may
find such publicity highly privacy invasive. A member of the relevant community, who operates with the understanding of the community’s norm, may have a divergent preference if she did not internalize her community’s norm.80 Disclosing information about her
religion’s practices may not offend her, though she understands it to
be offensive within her community. The aggregation of these individual preferences, though, does not equate to information privacy
norms. The social underpinnings of information privacy are interrelational and normatively antecedent: if members of a community did
not understand, among themselves, knowledge about their religious
practices to have any social significance, “privacy preferences” with
respect to their disclosure would be incoherent.
The individualist paradigm’s inappositeness to addressing privacy protection is particularly acute in the platform political economy. This paradigm conceives of information privacy harms as affecting individual consumers. The social character of personal information on the Internet complicates this premise—personal information nominally about one individual bears implications about numerous others, whether related by family or community ties, shared
demographics, or other characteristics.81 Thus an individual’s loss
of information privacy not only harms her, but also other similar or
proximate individuals.82 “Individual” harms, at scale, also
social norms); Spencer, supra note 13, at 844, 846 (noting societal expectations of privacy
fluctuate with changing social practices and society inevitably disagrees about particular
privacy expectations); Acquisti et al., supra note 24, at 446–47 (noting privacy sensitivities
are subjective, idiosyncratic, and vary over time and across circumstances); Strahilevitz,
supra note 26, at 2022; Samuelson, supra note 13, at 1172 (noting concepts of information
privacy are evolving over time). See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT
(2009) (describing privacy norms as deeply contextual).
80
Post, supra note 71, at 963.
81
BERGEMANN & BONATTI, supra note 22, at 2.
82
Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1261 (describing concrete individual harms from losses
of privacy, such as identity theft and other forms of fraud); Nehf, supra note 24, at 26–27
(describing individual harms as loss of dignity, autonomy, or self, as well as a loss of
control over how information about an individual is used by others in a way that affects
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undermine a community’s ability to form norms and overpower
their expectations of information privacy.83
Further, individual control presumes the individual, acting in her
own interest, will preserve the community norm that gives her particular preference its meaning. This condition fails on the Internet,
where the individual (and immediate) benefit is more palpable than
the subtle erosion of the information privacy to which she ought to
be entitled.
Finally, the individualist paradigm takes platform information
privacy rules as given. Scholars and lawmakers thus use the paradigm to attempt to ameliorate individual consumers’ difficulties
making preference-satisfying information-sharing decisions within
a platform’s information privacy rules and otherwise do not question
who ought to decide the rules that afford these decisions.84 Presuming platforms decide their own information privacy rules overlooks
and, in effect, displaces communities’ role in constructing and protecting information privacy norms.85 Reliance on the individualist
paradigm therefore enables platform hegemony over information

her); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 57, at 2283; Baron, supra note 38, at 390 (describing
individual harm as loss of power to determine which facts about oneself are disclosed and
how they are presented). In economic terms, the second-order harm felt by the community
and other individuals within it is described as an “externality” because it is not borne by
the individual whose information is disclosed. Savage, supra note 24, at 110; BERGEMANN
& BONATTI, supra note 22, at 2.
83
Fairfield and Engel write that the individual will contribute rationally to the erosion
of her privacy vis-à-vis sharing personal information as long as the individual’s direct costs
and share of social costs are together less than her private gain. Fairfield & Engel, supra
note 14, at 423; see also Rothchild, supra note 28, at 614; Nehf, supra note 24, at 9, 14
(describing the tradeoff between obtaining the benefits of information technologies and
having to disclose personal information in the process); Acquisti et al., supra note 24, at
477. But see Bergelson, supra note 20, at 402 (arguing individual control will not
necessarily lead to erosion of privacy when combined with government supervision).
84
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 525–27 (1988).
85
C.f. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1186–87,
1194 (2018); Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2436 (2020).

816

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792

privacy’s private governance, which precludes consumers from
shaping and protecting the norms that characterize their identities.86
D. Democracy without Government
In a democratic society, collective harms are typically met with
government intervention87 and private litigation. As in the case of
environmental pollution, when a private entity harms society at
large, the government intervenes to regulate and, perhaps, prohibit
the offensive behavior.88 Similarly, class actions provide groups of
citizens redress against collectively harmful behavior.89 However,
as described, both government intervention and private litigation
have failed to mitigate platforms’ erosion of communities’ information privacy. Instead, information privacy law’s reliance on
notice and consent has entrenched platform power.90 Even calls for
legal reform have generally sought to improve notice and provide
more granular choice mechanisms rather than reform the self-regulatory system that gives platforms overwhelming control over information privacy.91
86
C.f. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1617 (2018) (“‘[N]ew governance model[s]’
identify several features that accurately describe the interplay between user and platform:
a ‘dynamic’ and ‘iterative’ ‘law-making process’; ‘norm-generating’ ‘[i]ndividuals’; and
‘convergence of processes and outcomes.’”) (internal citations omitted).
87
Hetcher, supra note 18, at 121; Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1292–94, 1304; Calo,
supra note 9, at 677–78 (quoting Jules Coleman, Competition and Cooperation, 98 ETHICS
76, 80 (1987)); Janger, supra note 46, at 105; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 420; c.f.
Nehf, supra note 24, at 5 (stating the resolution to general societal concerns tends to be
enforcement of a legal norm through government agency oversight and regulation).
88
See generally, Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution 6–7, 33–44 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. L.
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 679, 2018) (calling for data regulation that conceives
of privacy harms as “pollution” akin to environmental harms that justify government
intervention).
89
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347,
352 (2003) (“The class action mechanism is, of course, often posited as the preferred
solution to aggregate cases where the collective harm is widespread . . . .”).
90
See supra Section I.B.
91
These calls for legal reforms include calls for federal omnibus legislation, FTC
empowerment, and expansions to common law tort, property, and contract law theories and
causes of action. Balkin, supra note 35, at 1199 (citation omitted) (describing Eugene
Volokh’s proposed contractarian privacy framework); Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note
38, at 259 (citation omitted) (describing general support for omnibus legislation adopting
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In the absence of governmental regulation, platforms’ private
governance of information privacy lacks political legitimacy from
the beginning. However, democratic theory suggests rules affecting
society gain political legitimacy when they are determined by those
whom they affect (and thus are not determined by an alien “ruling
class”).92 Hence, private governance may gain political legitimacy
if those affected are able to participate in its rule promulgation.
Democratic freedom requires citizens to have a voice in the decisions to which they are subject, whereas in an autocracy decisions
are imposed on citizens through compulsion, requiring citizens’
submission.93 Democracy does not require unanimity; some amount
of dissidence can be presumed.94 Rather, democratic legitimacy is
derived from “a basic agreement” in which citizens agree to be
bound by their collective decisions, regardless whether they individually agree with them.95 In the context of First Amendment doctrine,
Professor Robert Post explains the “essence of democracy” is the
opportunity to participate in the formation of the communal will,
through ongoing deliberation in which majority and minority views
Fair Information Practices and, potentially, creation of a new data protection agency);
Hartzog & Solove, supra note 57, at 2245, 2266, 2271–73, 2275, 2294, 2297–98 (arguing
in favor of empowered and aggressive FTC); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic,
Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should Do What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 1117, 1125, 1136–37, 1142–43, 1145–47 (2019) (describing characteristics
federal privacy law ought to have and arguing for expanded FTC jurisdiction due to its
expertise, experience, and resources, or creation of a dedicated federal privacy
commission); Litman, supra note 13, at 1288, 1312–13 (arguing in favor of expanded tort
law, based on breach of confidence, because it would avoid the alienability trap of property
rules and allow courts to appreciate subtle distinctions in context); Samuelson, supra note
13 at 1127, 1150–51, 1156, 1158, 1167 (advocating for expanded tort law by setting a
default rule forbidding certain data-handling practices absent consent); Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 66, at 669, 673 (arguing the FTC should take holistic view of consumer
experience when determining consumer expectations); see McClurg, supra note 13 (setting
out in detail a tort approach to online privacy, expanding the appropriation tort). See also
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering
Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1310–11 (1998) (citation
omitted) (describing a range of other arguments in favor of contract).
92
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 3,
6 (Harper Collins Publishers 2004); c.f. PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTICE 24 (1969) (describing the morality of cooperation as emergent from below rather
than imposed from above).
93
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 92, at 3, 5.
94
Id. at 9.
95
Id. at 9; see also Post, supra note 71, at 978.
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are heard.96 In this sense, democracy is not “majoritarian,” but rather
the product of dialogic communication.97
Platforms’ private governance, in which they unilaterally determine consumers’ information privacy98, lacks democratic legitimacy. In effect, platforms form a sort of “ruling class” that determines the information privacy consumers may receive and expect.
Platforms’ determination of information privacy affect consumers
individually and collectively insofar as platforms undermine and
override consumers’ ability to generate the information privacy
norms that shape their identities. Moreover, consumers have no
voice in platforms’ decisions with respect to their information
privacy. Platforms attain hegemonic status; consumers are their
subjects.
Democratic legitimation of information privacy may be possible, however, even without the promulgation of law. Within a
system of private governance, it would require that those affected
by private rules have a role in their determination. Accordingly,
private governance of information privacy could gain democratic
legitimacy if consumers were able to shape and determine information privacy norms and the rules that protect them. Democratic
private governance of information privacy cannot occur at the level
of the individual consumer. Information privacy’s social foundations indicate that communities, rather than individuals, form information privacy norms in the first instance.99 And, practically, in
the platform political economy, individual consumers lack the
requisite bargaining power to affect platforms’ information privacy rules. Moreover, the social character of personal information
online suggests myriad other consumers may have an interest in
96

Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L REV. 1109, 1115 (1993) [hereinafter “Meiklejohn’s Mistake”];
see also Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of
Social Form, in Democratic Community: 35 NOMOS: AM. SOC’Y POL. LEGAL PHIL. 163,
170–71 (1993) (citation omitted) (describing Hans Kelsen’s view that self-determination
is in the ability of persons to participate in the creation of their social order) [hereinafter
“Between Democracy and Community”].
97
Between Democracy and Community, supra note 96, at 170–71 (citation omitted).
98
See supra Sections I.A. , I.C. , & I.D.
99
See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text; see also ZUBOFF, supra note 12,
at ch. 17 (calling for collective action to countervail the power of surveillance capital).
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any individual’s information privacy.100 Hence, democratic private
governance would require the consumer-community, as a collective,
to be able to decide information privacy norms and the rules that
protect them.101
In 2009, Facebook attempted to “democratize” its platform governance. It announced it would open up certain documents in its
suite of Terms of Service to a user referendum designed by Facebook; it planned to extend this same procedure to its Privacy Policy.102 The planned referendum process centered on user input on
proposed “Facebook Principles” and a “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities” drafted by Facebook.103 It involved, at the first stage,
virtual Town Hall meetings open to user comments and the solicitation of written comments.104 Facebook would then review users’
comments, revise the two documents to incorporate any changes it
decided to make, and release a summary of the most common and
significant comments it received.105 The revised documents would
then be submitted to a user vote on whether to adopt the documents,

100

In the case of non-normative “data protection,” consumer collectivization may not be
socially imperative, insofar as data privacy does not constitute individual and community
identity. Regardless, collectivization may be practically imperative due to the
government’s abstention from intervention, the social character of personal information
online, and individual consumers’ inability to bargain effectively.
101
Wikipedia is often offered a model of democratic private governance within the realm
of speech regulation. See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in EMERGING
THREATS (2017); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 (2006); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008); MIKE ANANNY & KATE CRAWFORD,
SEEING WITHOUT KNOWING: LIMITATIONS OF THE TRANSPARENCY IDEAL AND ITS
APPLICATION TO ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2016). Notably, Wikipedia’s data
practices are not decided by dispersed, decentralized contributors in the same way as its
content moderation. See Privacy Policy, WIKIMEDIA FOUND. (May 17, 2018),
https://foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/Privacy_policy
[https://perma.cc/YV54-TTAG]
(stating Wikipedia privacy policy is promulgated by the Wikimedia Foundation’s Board of
Trustees). Whether the Wikipedia model of democratic speech governance could support
democratic privacy governance is a rich question deserving of standalone attention and, as
such, it is not pursued in this Article.
102
See Facebook Opens Governance of Service and Policy Process to Users, FACEBOOK
(Feb. 26, 2009), https://about.fb.com/news/2009/02/facebook-opens-governance-ofservice-and-policy-process-to-users/ [https://perma.cc/6HKD-G7YP].
103
See id.
104
See id.
105
See id.
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scheduled to occur on a single day.106 That vote would become
“binding” if more than 30% of then-active Facebook users (an estimated 52 million users) voted.107
When referendum day arrived, 665,654 users voted, with the
majority in favor of adopting the proposals as written.108 Then, in
2012, Facebook held a vote on a new policy—to get rid of voting.109
Eighty-eight percent of the 668,500 votes cast opposed this revision.110 Facebook implemented the new policy regardless.111
Setting aside the referendum’s implementation failure, its design
reveals a key misunderstanding about democratic process. The opportunity to voice concerns and vote (ceremonially) in favor or
against rules drafted unilaterally by a ruler does not amount to democratic decision-making. Rather, it more closely resembles a form
of authoritarian constitutionalism, which “accepts many governance
features of constitutional democracy with the noteworthy exception
of . . . democracy itself.”112 Facebook’s control over the decisionmaking process precludes it from creating public discourse that truly
instantiates democratic decision-making; democratic self-determination reaches past the substance of collective decisions and encompasses decision-making about the process of deliberation and decision-making as well.113 Democratic legitimacy thus requires the
public to not only make decisions about societal matters collectively, but also determine collectively the form and structure of the
decision-making process. Even if Facebook had subjected its
106

See id.
Id.; see Facebook Opens Up Voting for Site’s Terms of Service, ADWEEK (Apr. 16,
2009),
https://www.adweek.com/performance-marketing/facebook-terms-voting/
[https://perma.cc/H9X6-YGAH].
108
See Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg Wants to Democratize Facebook—Here’s What
Happened When He Tried, THE VERGE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/4/5/17176834/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-democracy-governance-vote-failure
[https://perma.cc/4CVU-9J8K].
109
See id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See David Pozen, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Facebookland, KNIGHT FIRST
AMEND. INST., COLUM. UNIV. (Oct. 30, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/authoritarian-constitutionalism-facebookland
[https://perma.cc/LK4R-FDSS].
113
Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 96, at 1117.
107
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Privacy Policy to a user referendum, the results of the process would
not have been decided democratically. Instead, we can begin to
understand how information privacy may be decided more democratically within the existing private governance system by looking
to concepts from industrial democracy, which sought to democratize
workplace decision-making through robust self-determination
mechanisms.
II. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AS A MODEL FOR PLATFORM DEMOCRACY

Democratizing private governance is a novel approach to legitimating platform information privacy. It has, however, been theorized extensively as a response to an analogous context: the labor
political economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.114 Confronting similar conditions of employer hegemony and
worker powerlessness over the conditions of labor, concepts of industrial democracy arose to democratize workplace decision-making.115 Industrial democracy borrowed heavily from political democracy, calling for workers to have the opportunity to participate
in workplace governance.116 It sought to implement a number of democratizing structures that can be organized into three levels: first,
in the internal processes of the intermediating bargaining institution
(i.e., the union); second, through the rebalancing of bargaining
power between workers and an employer vis-à-vis workers’ collective action; and, third, by governing the terms and conditions of labor through a collective bargaining agreement which holds the employer accountable to its workers.117
Industrial democracy may serve as a roadmap to democratize
platform information privacy due to both the fundamental similarities between the labor and online platform political economies and
the notion that, in each, private governance ought to be legitimated
114 See MILTON DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865–1965,
6–22 (1970) (tracing the history and theorization of industrial democracy from late 1797
to the 1940s).
115 Id. at 10.
116 Id. at 10, 18–19.
117 I categorize the structures proposed in industrial democracy literature into these three
levels to lay out, in as streamlined a manner as possible, the process of making private
governance more democratic from the inside out. This is not a taxonomy made explicit
by any single source in the literature.
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through democratic procedures. The dissimilarities of the platform
political economy, however, suggest industrial democracy structures will have to adapt considerably to legitimate platform information privacy.
A. Labor and Online Platform Political Economies
The labor political economy in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century shared fundamental characteristics with the platform political economy. It similarly gave rise to a system of private
governance in which employers had hegemonic power to determine
the terms and conditions of unskilled workers’ labor.118 Employers
were able to set wages and other conditions of labor—including
hours, time off, fringe benefits, and health and safety precautions—
and they were incented to set these terms at their lowest cost.119 Employers’ overwhelming decision-making power came from their
bargaining advantage relative to individual workers.120 Employers
knew the state of the market and the demand for labor, were more
skilled at bargaining by virtue of their past bargaining experience,
and did not depend on employing any particular worker—therefore,
they were indifferent to individual employment decisions.121

118

Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 86–88, 93–94, 98–99 (citations omitted); Richard A.
Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 991 (1984); Eric Tucker,
Renorming Labour Law: Can We Escape Labour Law’s Recurring Regulatory Dilemmas?,
39 INDUS. L.J. 99, 107 (2010). But see Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of
Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2006) (arguing monopsonist employers are
willing to provide contract terms that buyers, i.e., workers, are willing to pay for, such that
the employer’s market power does not prevent free negotiation between the employer and
an individual employee).
119
Jedidiah J. Kroncke, The False Hope of Unions Democracy, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 615,
637–38 (2018) (citation omitted) (noting Elizabeth Anderson uses the term “private
government” to describe the vastness of employers’ power over workers); Marc T. Moore,
Reconstituting Labour Market Freedom: Corporate Governance and Collective Worker
Counterbalance, 43 INDUS. L. J. 398, 408 (2014) (citation omitted) (“[W]ithin the typically
broad limits stated in the employment contract, the entrepreneur is free to direct and
organise [sp] the employee’s work in accordance with her own discretion and in light of
the perceived exigencies of the business, without the need either to seek the assent of the
employee to each ordered task or to negotiate the latter’s compensation for each task on an
ongoing basis.”)
120
GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 12–13.
121
Id. at 13.
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By contrast, individual workers had little power to decide the
terms of their labor, let alone demand their employers adopt terms
they favor.122 Though workers may have understood generally that
they were undercompensated or worked in dangerous conditions,
they lacked knowledge of business, their industry, and the demand
for labor, which limited their ability to articulate demands on their
employers.123 Additionally, workers were eager to be employed so
that they could earn wages124; if there were only a small number of
nearby employers, workers were unable to substitute employment125
and, in general, they could not exit the labor market altogether—and
forgo wages—while sustaining their lives.126 Moreover, employers’
control over labor terms and conditions led workers to believe they
lacked the ability to exert any such control and, accordingly, they
sought only modest rewards.127
A collective action problem compounded individual workers’
inability to bargain. When workers are treated uniformly, the goals
they pursue, i.e., higher wages and better working conditions,128 are
“public goods” that suffer from a free-rider problem. An individual
worker would incur costs to pursue these goals, but, once achieved
by other workers, she could benefit without incurring any cost. A
rational, self-interested worker thus would not incur the expenses,
pecuniary or otherwise, to obtain higher wages and better working
conditions and would instead rely on others to provide the good so

122
See MARK PERLMAN, LABOR UNION THEORIES IN AMERICA 150–51 (1958);
GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 12.
123
See PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 201 (quoting SELIG PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE
LABOR MOVEMENT 239 (1928) [hereinafter “A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT”]); see
also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 13.
124
See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 13.
125
Judge Richard Posner skeptically acknowledges that workers may be either ignorant
of their alternative employment opportunities or otherwise incur heavy costs by changing
jobs. See Posner, supra note 118 at 991–92; see also Barnhizer supra note 13, at 93–94
(citations omitted).
126
See Eric Tucker, Renorming Labour Law: Can We Escape Labour Law’s Recurring
Regulatory Dilemmas?, 39 INDUS. L.J. 99, 107 (2010); see also SELZNICK, supra note 92,
at 144.
127
See PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 200–201 (quoting A THEORY OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT, supra note 122, at 238–39).
128
See generally ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 27 (1962).
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that she may benefit for free.129 This incentive to free ride creates a
collective action problem—though workers would benefit from
coming together to pursue higher wages and better working conditions, they fail to do so because of the economic incentive to defect.130 Individual workers’ divergent, or even antithetical, preferences may exacerbate this collective action problem.131 For example, some workers may prioritize higher wages over more time off,
or vice versa, and junior workers may oppose the seniority rights
more senior workers would enjoy. Workers’ geographic dispersion
would also make collective action more difficult to achieve.132
Platforms’ sources of bargaining power mirror and expand beyond those employers enjoyed. Platforms, by virtue of their experience monetizing personal information, are able to evaluate the market and demand for personal information.133 They may also be more
skilled at bargaining due to their business experience and professional staff. Finally, they are indifferent to the collection of individual pieces of personal information and personal information from
particular individuals, due to their relatively insignificant monetary
value and platforms’ ability to obtain information from third parties.134
The ability to obtain personal information from third parties confers an even greater bargaining advantage on platforms than

129

See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 11, 21 (1965); see also
Posner, supra note 118, at 994.
130
See Peter Levine, The Legitimacy of Labor Unions, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
529, 546 (2001) (citation omitted).
131
See OLSON, supra note 129, at 11. Writing in 1911, Greenwood describes the
collective action problem as due to the “poverty, timidity, and lack of intelligence” that
render workers almost incapable of self-organizing. GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 57–58.
132
See D. Bruce Johnsen, Who Captures the Rents from Unionization? Insights from
Multiemployer Pension Plans, 1 AM. BUS. L. REV. 193, 205–06 (2012) (citation omitted).
133
Publicly traded companies, including Facebook and Google, file quarterly Form 10Q reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission that include managements’
predictions of market demand. See, e.g., Form 10-Q, 30, Facebook, Inc. (filed Oct. 30,
2020) (stating management’s expectations about upcoming demand for online advertising
services); Form 10-Q, 35–36, Alphabet, Inc. (filed Oct. 30, 2020) (stating management’s
expectations about effect of COVID-19 pandemic on market).
134
See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014); see also supra notes 23–24 and
accompanying text.
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employers have: even if a consumer abstains from a platform, that
platform may nevertheless obtain a constant stream of her personal
information as she browses webpages that contain the platform’s
cookies or other plug ins.135 In the labor context, this would be
the equivalent—however paradoxical—of an employer obtaining
a worker’s labor regardless of the worker’s employment. And,
whereas for labor, both employers and workers knew the existing
wages and working conditions, only the platforms know precisely
what personal information they collect, how they use it, and how
their promised information privacy protections are operationalized.
Moreover, platforms have the unique ability to undermine consumers’ information privacy demands by leveraging their knowledge of
each particular consumer’s interests, tastes, and beliefs. Altogether,
platforms can be viewed as a type of “super bargainer” which hold
sole knowledge about the subject of the bargain, are able to obtain
what they seek regardless of their counterparty’s walk-away, and
can manipulate their counterparty due to their vast and intimate
knowledge.
Likewise, consumers share a number of workers’ bargaining
constraints, but suffer additional impairments due to structural differences in the platform political economy. Akin to workers, most
consumers know little of the market and demand for their personal
information.136 But, because consumers also lack knowledge of how
platforms collect and use personal information,137 they could not
know the value platforms ascribe to their personal information or
how platforms’ data-handling practices affect their information privacy. In this context, the difference between workers’ wages and
consumers’ information privacy is evident. Workers know both the
135

See, e.g., Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s
Journey Toward Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39, 70–73 (2019) (describing in depth the deployment of Facebook
code on third-party websites for tracking purposes); see also John Koetsier, Google Is
Tracking You on 86% of the Top 50,000 Websites on the Planet, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2020/03/11/google-is-tracking-you-on-86-ofthe-top-50000-websites-on-the-planet/?sh=18d1dc84750f [https://perma.cc/TR2C-NW
4K].
136
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 39, at 60 (noting that 73% of survey respondents heard little to nothing about the aggregation of personal data used to form comprehensive behavioral profiles for advertising and risk assessment purposes).
137
See supra notes 37–46.
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amount of their wages and how their wages affect their standard of
living and hence could formulate demands for higher wages. By
contrast, consumers do not know how their personal information is
collected and used and do not know how those practices affect their
information privacy. Without this knowledge, consumers could not
know what to demand from platforms.
Consumers’ need for platforms mirror, in part, workers’ need to
work, but is somewhat more complex. Just as workers need to earn
wages to support their lives and may be unable to substitute employers in their locality, consumers face concrete costs from abstaining
from participation on certain platforms and may be unable to find
adequate substitutes. Even for those platforms whose consumer
products are not as essential as a worker’s wages, consumers are
driven to engage because of the attractive value proposition of a
“free” service, network effects, and addictive qualities.
Finally, consumers, as compared to workers, face a greater collective action problem. Consumers-at-large of online platforms are
both geographically and socially distant. For example, Facebook users in India and Mexico are not only physically distant, but they also
may not be connected through their networks of friends. Moreover,
they come from cultures and sub-cultures that may differ substantially on information privacy norms and standards. This stands in
contrast to an employer’s workers who, though perhaps located in
different cities, could nevertheless locate one another through their
shared employment and could be expected to share a set of common
cultural values and norms with respect to their labor. And, whereas
workers’ preferences may diverge but are nevertheless concrete
(e.g., a dollar amount of wages, a number of paid days off, or specific health and safety precautions), consumers’ information privacy
preferences may be highly idiosyncratic, conflicting, and difficult to
describe.138

138

Consider, for example, three siblings. The first sibling elects to send her saliva sample to a company that uses it to diagnose food sensitivities and intolerances, target advertising, and build and improve its products and services. She does not feel that any of these
practices violate her privacy. The second sibling would send his saliva sample to the
company if it used it solely to diagnose his food sensitivities and intolerances; using his
biometric information for advertising and improving products would violate his desired
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In the labor context, the bargaining-power disparity between
employers and individual workers placed workers at the mercy of
their employers with respect to wages and working conditions,139
under threat of being forced down to a bare subsistence level.140 Labor scholars, most notably Sidney and Beatrice Webb, witnessed
employer hegemony and, in the absence of worker-protective law,
called for the private legitimation of workplace decision-making
through democratic structures.141 Unions were a centerpiece in the
movement for industrial democracy. The ideal labor union would
channel and represent workers’ interests against overreaching employers,142 counteract the power imbalance inherent in the employer-worker relationship,143 and thereby enable workers to influence the terms and conditions of their labor.
The platform political economy’s more pronounced bargainingpower disparity yields a dynamic much the same as for employers
and workers. Individual consumers are at the mercy of platforms
with respect to their information privacy and they are already forced
down to a level that maximizes financial returns to the platforms, at

privacy in that information. The third sibling would consider the disclosure of her biometric information to any company a violation of her privacy. Yet, the second and third
siblings’ privacy preferences inherently conflict with those of the first sibling: when the
first sibling shares her saliva with the company, the company obtains valuable information not only about that first sibling, but about the second and third siblings as well,
given that they share genetic characteristics. Not only do these siblings privacy preferences differ—but if one sibling’s preferences are granted, the other two siblings’ preferences are infringed.
139
See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 12; see Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property:
Guestworkers, International Trade, and the Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 27, 36 (2006); see also Moore, supra note 119, at 416–17. See generally ZUBOFF,
supra note 12, ch. 6.
140
See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15, 30; see also Moore, supra note 119, at 411
(describing employers’ allocative discretion due to the open-endedness of their ability to
make decisions within the employment relationship).
141
See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 7. See also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 36; Tucker,
supra note 126, at 108; Moore, supra note 119, at 415, 422.
142
See Johnsen, supra note 132, at 205–06 (citation omitted).
143
See Tucker, supra note 126, at 107, 114 (quoting J. W. Budd, R. Gomez, & N. Meltz,
Why Balance Is Best: The Pluralist Industrial Relations Paradigm of Balancing Competing
Interests, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WORK AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
201, 201 (B. E. Kaufman ed., 2004); see Levine, supra note 130, at 547–48 (internal
citations omitted); see Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, SUP. CT. REV. 21, 46–47 (2018);
see also SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 144.
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their information privacy’s expense. Just as poor wages and working
conditions harmed workers, the harm to information privacy is serious. Platform hegemony precludes consumers, as a sector of society,
from producing information privacy norms that form aspects of their
identities. Though such societal harm would typically spur governmental action, such an intervention is not forthcoming. Alternatively, a private counterforce, helmed by the consumer community,
may legitimate platforms’ information privacy rules by empowering
and enfranchising affected consumers.
Industrial democracy may instruct on how to theorize the democratization of platform information privacy. It builds from a starting point characterized by hegemony and it provides a ready model
for the translation of themes and structures from political democracy
into private governance. Hence, features of industrial democracy
can help frame platform democracy, but that frame must be filled
based on the platform political economy’s divergences and idiosyncrasies.
B. Democracy at Three Levels
Proponents of industrial democracy sought to legitimate workplace decision-making by deploying a number of democratizing
structures, which may be organized into three levels: (1) internal,
through the democratic formation and operation of a collective bargaining organization (i.e., the union); (2) procedural, through workers’ accumulation of bargaining power to counteract that of employers; and (3) contractual, through a mutually enforceable agreement
that binds workers and employers, grants some of the workers’ demands, and holds employers accountable. These structures would
legitimate workplace decision-making much in the same way government is democratically legitimated: they allow workers to participate in a sort of “public forum,” influence the terms that bind them,
and hold employers-qua-decision-makers accountable to them.
Though industrial democracy’s structures apply concepts of political legitimacy to the particularities of the labor political economy,
the labor and platform political economies’ fundamental similarities
suggest these structures can help frame information privacy’s legitimation within private governance.
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1. Internal Democracy
Industrial democracy begins internally, through democratic selfgovernment within a collective bargaining organization—typically,
a union. Unions, in their ideal form, achieve internal democracy
through membership participation in union formation, its internal
organization and procedures, including the articulation of demands
on employers,144 and union leadership accountability to members.
Unions form democratically through the establishment of a
“common rule”: an agreement among a cohort of workers on the
terms under which they will accept employment, an understanding
among them that no one will accept less favorable terms, and the
coordination of labor withdrawal (i.e., a strike) if their employer
does not accede.145 Formation may be bottom-up, that is, led by a
group of workers at a particular workplace, or top-down, in which
an existing national organization reaches into a workplace to organize its workers. Whereas prior to the promulgation of labor law, unions relied on employers’ voluntary or coerced acknowledgement to
gain recognition as workers’ bargaining agent,146 labor law formalized union formation through majoritarian voting. In short, after the
National Labor Relations Board approves of a particular “bargaining unit”—a group of workers that is sufficiently homogenous, yet
distinct from other workers, to enable it to bargain on behalf of the
entirety of the unit147—a majority of workers in that unit must agree
to form a union.148
144

See Kroncke, supra note 119, at 619; see Levine, supra note 130, at 544; see also
Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 794 (1984).
145
See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 16; see also Moore, supra note 119, at 423.
146
See REES, supra note 128, at 28.
147
See Andrias, supra note 143, at 24; see Posner, supra note 118, at 995 (citing National
Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982)). Judge Posner notes the bargaining
unit will ordinarily be limited to one factory even if the factory’s owner owns other
factories as well and there are often more than one unit in a particular factory. Id. at 995.
148
See Andrias, supra note 143, at 24; see Posner, supra note 118, at 993–94 (citation
omitted). If less than fifty percent, but at least thirty percent of workers in the bargaining
unit agree to unionize, the Board will order a representation election. See Posner, supra
note 118, at 996 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1983)). Following an election campaign,
members of the bargaining unit must vote on whether to make the proposed union the
exclusive bargaining agent of the bargaining unit. See Posner, supra note 118, at 995 (citing
29 U.S.C. §§ 9(a), 159(a)). A majority must vote in favor for the union to form. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a).
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Workers may then organize and operate a union democratically
through worker participation in deliberation, election of representatives, and voting.149 Unions are typically structured as representative
organizations; members elect union officials who craft the union
agenda and demands on employers and select negotiators to bargain
on the union’s behalf.150 Procedures for membership participation
may range, at the high end, from demand formation through deliberation and popular ratification of bargaining agreements,151 to voting for their officials, to the bare minimum of voting for the union’s
formation. The greater opportunities for member participation the
better for union democracy.152 When workers are able to make collective decisions about the working conditions they seek, they
149

See Levine, supra note 130, at 544, 568; see also Kroncke, supra note 119, at 619.
See REES, supra note 128, at 174. There is a robust debate on the extent to which
representative governance reduces union democracy. Scholars supporting representative
democracy in unions argue that workers benefit from relying on experts to represent them
to negotiate on their behalf due to the complex nature of calculating wage rates, the
difficulty of negotiations between a large number of workers and a single or multiple
employers, the superior knowledge of the industry representatives attain through the
bargaining process, and representatives’ proclivity to make more tempered (and thereby,
agreeable) demands on employers. See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 16, 40; see PERLMAN,
supra note 122, at 152, 153; see Hyde, supra note 144, at 830; see REES, supra note 128,
at 180; see also DONALD L. MARTIN, AN OWNERSHIP THEORY OF THE TRADE UNION 86–87
(1980); ORLEY ASHENFELTER & GEORGE E. JOHNSON, BARGAINING THEORY, TRADE
UNIONS, AND INDUSTRIAL STRIKE ACTIVITY 36 (1969). On the other side of the debate,
scholars acknowledge that agency costs (i.e., the transaction costs principals incur to
monitor and constrain their agents) make it difficult for workers to monitor their
representatives, which could lead to representatives’ unchecked abuse of their role. See
Johnsen, supra note 132, at 206–08; see Levine, supra note 130, at 544–45. Others argue
relying on representation makes the bargaining process inherently “less participatory and
less democratic.” See Hyde, supra note 144, at 867–937.
151
See PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 150, 153 (quoting U.S. Comm’n on Indus. Rel., Joint
Agreements, at 193–94 (unpublished research paper) [hereinafter “Joint Agreements”]).
152
Professor Alan Hyde argues union democracy requires a baseline of member
participation that includes, among other things, the opportunity for members to express
their views on potential bargaining demands (especially through small, unstructured
meetings and referenda), member communication with their negotiators, member
representation on the negotiating team, member ratification of all bargaining demands and
all proposed agreements with employers, members’ right to oppose agreements, and
negotiators’ duty to educate the members about bargaining conditions. See Hyde, supra
note 144, at 794–95, 830, 845–47. He argues increased member participation will increase
the likelihood members will comply with the agreements which they have ratified. Id. at
830. But see Kroncke, supra note 119, at 643 (citation omitted) (noting little evidence
supports the proposition that a lack of participation weakens high-performing unions).
150

2021]

DEMOCRATIZING PLATFORM PRIVACY

831

“engage in democratic decision-making on a daily basis”153 generating “an inner public sphere” in the union that is akin to the liberal
state.154 The benefits that inhere in union democracy likewise mirror
those observed in democratic government: workers are free to associate and to criticize their workplace, they become educated about
their industry, including its requirements for production and its limitations, and they develop individual responsibility to their organization that tempers extreme, idiosyncratic views.155
As in democratic government, tensions exist when a union purports to speak for all workers, including members who dissent and
those who are not members in the first instance.156 However, a union’s democratic legitimacy derives from workers’ ability to contribute to formation of the group will, despite the presence of internal disagreement about particular aims.157 As such, these critiques
do not undermine a union’s legitimacy, which rests on workers’
ability to participate. Rather, they caution that unionization’s democratic benefits require internal procedures that give voice to all union
constituents.158
Leadership accountability to members is crucial to a union’s
democratic formation, lest union official hegemony replace employer hegemony. At base, union leaders are accountable to members because members may vote them out of office. Union leaders
are also, in general, more likely to be responsive to members’ interests when they align ideologically and take pride in their
153

Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 647 (2019) (citation omitted);
Andrias, supra note 143, at 46–47.
154
Levine, supra note 130, at 568; see also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 38; PERLMAN,
supra note 122, at 153 (quoting Joint Agreements, supra note 151, at 193–94) (“The
workers are not only members of a democratic organization of their own for collective
action in regard to the terms of employment, but citizens of a dual government for the
industry as a whole in labor matters. They elect representatives to a joint legislative body;
they participate directly or through their national officers in the selection of members of a
joint judiciary which is in many cases also a joint executive with large powers of enforcing
its decision.”); c.f. Kroncke, supra note 119, at 619.
155
PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 152–53; Levine, supra note 130, at 568–69.
156
Kroncke, supra note 119, at 654; Andrias, supra note 153, at 628; Levine, supra note
130, at 545–46, 565.
157
Hyde, supra note 144, at 794–95, 806–08, 832.
158
Id. at 807–08.
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advocacy.159 Finally, unions’ duty of fair representation, a fiduciary
obligation imposed by law,160 keeps union leadership accountable to
all constituents, including non-members, by requiring unions to represent fairly all constituents’ views when entering collective bargaining.161
Internal platform-democratic structures can draw from internal
industrial-democratic structures, but they will have to diverge in certain respects to address the platform political economy and online
social networks’ nuances. As in the labor context, a consumer collective bargaining organization could gain democratic legitimacy
through democratic formation, consumer participation in the organization’s formation and operations, and leadership accountability.
Each of these features of internal industrial democracy will likely
look substantially different in the platform context.
As for labor organizing, consumer organizing can take a bottomup (“grassroots”) or top-down (“institutional”) approach. The online
grassroots approach is bound to look fairly different than in the
workplace, where workers are able to identify each other easily, petition each other directly, and organize a meeting among themselves
to decide their demands and agree to strike if they are not met.162 By
contrast, consumers’ abilities to directly identify, petition, and deliberate with one another are limited by the reach of their online social networks. The nested, overlapping structure of online social

159
REES, supra note 128, at 174, 180; Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics,
38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1013 (1986); Ashenfelter & Johnson, supra note 150, at 36.
160
The duty of fair representation was developed by courts rather than statute. Campbell,
supra note 159, at 1013 n.112 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335, 342 (1964)).
161
Hyde, supra note 144, at 806; Andrias, supra note 143, at 24 (citing Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967)); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944);
REES, supra note 128, at 29; see also Campbell, supra note 159, at 1013 (internal citations
omitted). Unions’ fiduciary obligation to all workers in the unit is often attached to the
workers’ obligation to pay dues, regardless of their membership in the union; though in
some systems, unions’ obligation attains even though non-members are not required to pay.
Andrias, supra note 143, at 24–25 (internal citation omitted). Alan Hyde describes in detail
the procedural requirements courts have imposed on unions under the duty of fair
representation, including the use of a “rational decision-making process” to ascertain
worker interests and desires and an equitable procedure for protecting the interests of all
workers in the event of intraunion conflict. Hyde, supra note 144, at 805–06.
162
See REES, supra note 128, at 27.
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networks163 suggest identification and petitioning may be possible
iteratively—consumers can identify and petition those within their
network and those who agree can identify and petition members of
their other social groups. Online organizing efforts may spread
broadly, rapidly, at low cost, and with little time investment.
These vast interconnected networks are unlikely to “meet” to decide collectively their demands in any proper sense. Rather, grassroots-turned-institutional movements such as Black Lives Matter164
suggest anecdotally that a smaller group of highly motivated individuals may formulate and propose demands and lead the organizing
effort. Consumers’ agreement to organize would be reflected in their
public statement of solidarity. Consumer “deliberation” over the
smaller group’s articulated demands may, at a minimum, involve
consumers’ individual, public agreement or disagreement with the
set of demands. They may also involve public-facing conversation
(e.g., Facebook posts, Twitter tweets, or Reddit threads) about these
demands that may lead to their revision.165
The democratic operation of online grassroots organizing must
also adapt to the Internet’s affordances and constraints. As noted,
direct participation in articulating a set of demands may practically
be limited to public-facing conversation. Likewise, consumers’
agreement to act collectively and to align on a set of demands—their
“vote”—and their “election” of representatives may be limited to
public affirmation of their solidarity with the smaller group’s articulated mission. There are, however, technologies that enable a more
traditional type of deliberation and voting. Liquid Feedback is a
software that allows users to start an “initiative,” disseminate it to
others, receive others’ feedback, and allow them to vote on the initiative.166

163
Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 435 (citing Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, &
Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records of
Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802, 5802 (2013)).
164
Herstory,
BLACK
LIVES
MATTER,
https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/
[https://perma.cc/K36G-QH6D].
165
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 836 (noting the Internet is a forum for deliberative
democracy).
166
LIQUID FEEDBACK, https://liquidfeedback.org/ [https://perma.cc/7MHM-ENXZ].
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Leadership accountability is a particular challenge following the
grassroots approach, as those who helm the grassroots effort may
not be subject to “election” in a traditional sense. Rather, leaders’
accountability will likely depend heavily on a high degree of ideological alignment between them and the broader group of consumers
whose interests are at stake.
An institutional approach to consumer organizing for information privacy may mirror labor organizing more closely. An institution already involved in privacy advocacy, much like a national
labor union, may identify and petition consumers to join a collective
bargaining organization, perhaps through advertising or by drawing
on existing membership or donor lists. The institution could then
implement labor-union-like internal democratic structures. Creating
these structures may involve public deliberation through online fora,
voting, and the election of representatives. It could create highly participatory mechanisms, such as bottom-up formation of demands
from its members’ deliberation and membership ratification of bargaining agreements, or limit participation to the decision to join the
institution’s collective bargaining organization.
One group, called RadicalxChange, is currently attempting to
organize people to pursue a number of initiatives including one focused on “data dignity.”167 It also draws from a metaphor to labor
and it intends to implement a range of internal democratic mechanisms, such as voting on priorities and initiatives and deliberation
through written comment.168 Such an organization could prove to be
a formidable testing ground for consumer collectivization and would
be a good fit to organize consumers for information privacy as well.
Following either a grassroots or an institutional approach, a
consumer collective bargaining organization’s constituent base will
be characteristically different than in the labor context. Legally,
labor union formation by voting requires the circumscription of a
167

About RxC, RADICALXCHANGE, https://www.radicalxchange.org/about/ [https://per
ma.cc/EMN7-7ATZ]; Data Dignity, RADICALXCHANGE, https://www.radicalxchange.org/
concepts/data-dignity/ [https://perma.cc/W686-FRE9].
168
THE DATA FREEDOM ACT 4–5, RADICALXCHANGE, https://www.radicalxchange.
org/kiosk/papers/data-freedom-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UEW-PXQM]; Alex Randaccio,
Introducing RxC Voice, RADICALXCHANGE (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.rad
icalxchange.org/kiosk/blog/introducing-rxc-voice/ [https://perma.cc/HL7B-LBB5].
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sufficiently homogenous yet distinct bargaining unit and a majority
vote in favor of formation.169 This requirement ensures unions represent their constituents fairly. In the platform setting, defining a
“bargaining unit” would prove difficult and may be unnecessary.
Whereas in the labor setting there were clear homogeneity markers
such as job roles, superficial markers of consumer homogeneity
(e.g., demographics, geographic location, and educational attainment) may not correlate with information privacy norms.170 Even
limiting the bargaining unit to a platform’s users in a particular
country may prove problematic, as platforms’ collection and use of
personal information extend beyond their user bases. However, instead of attempting to define ex ante a bargaining unit, a consumer
collective bargaining organization may limit its constituents to those
who decide to join. Even if an organization limits its constituency in
this manner, due to the social character of personal information
online, it ought to adopt a “duty of fair representation” to represent
the views of non-members affected by a platform’s information privacy rules, regardless whether those non-members use the platform.
As in the labor context, platform democracy’s internal structures
would ideally generate a public sphere that resembles the liberal
state. Consumers would make collective decisions about their information privacy and thereby engage in democratic decision-making.
Consumers would likewise receive the benefits of democratic association: they would be able to criticize a platform, become educated
about information privacy rules and how they are affected by them,
develop a responsibility to their collective interest, and transcend
idiosyncrasies to form shared norms. The organization would attain
democratic legitimacy on the same grounds as a labor union.
Regardless of dissent among those organized and the likelihood the
organization’s information privacy demands, if granted, would
affect non-members, the organization would be legitimate democratically due to consumers’ ability to contribute to the formation
of group will.

169
170

See supra notes 128–129.
Posner, supra note 118, at 995.
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2. Procedural Democracy
Internal democracy would legitimate a collective bargaining organization as a political institution. Instituting a process that empowers workers to influence the terms and conditions of their labor
would then legitimate workplace decision-making. Unions democratize the employer-worker relationship by accumulating worker
bargaining power through collective action and then bargaining collectively with employers, thereby serving as a counterforce to employer hegemony. Collective bargaining also reduces bargaining
costs relative to individual employer-worker negotiations by channeling otherwise diffuse worker demands on and commitments to
the employer into streamlined, overarching conditions that would
apply to all workers under the union’s purview.171
Through unions, workers engage in “private self-help”: they
channel worker voice into a set of streamlined and actionable demands, contribute to a robust civil society in which private groups
engage in public work,172 and shift power from employers to workers in the workplace.173 Unions counteract the harms to human
171

Moore, supra note 119, at 423; GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15–16; see also Levine,
supra note 130, at 538 (citation omitted). Moreover, unions’ ability to channel and formally
communicate worker voice and grievances, discipline workers who attempt unauthorized
strikes, and provide job security to workers, confers onto employers greater workplace
stability and reduced labor strife. Campbell, supra note 159, at 996 (citation omitted);
Posner, supra note 125, at 1000 (citation omitted); Tucker, supra note 126, at 114; c.f.,
Levine, supra note 130, at 540. Additionally, collective bargaining agreements may contain
“no-strike” clauses that allow an employer to get an injunction and, potentially, monetary
damages in the event of a union strike. Posner, supra note 118, at 999.
172
Levine, supra note 130, at 558; Andrias, supra note 153, at 648–49. Democratic union
governance as described fits what the late Professor Philip Selznick calls “the morality of
cooperation,” which is supportive of the development of civil society. The morality of
cooperation describes individuals as having commitments deriving from personal
autonomy and group requirements, norms as arising from group experience, cognizant of
individual and group differences, and focused on joint problem-solving through effective
communication and openness to divergent views. Selznick, supra note 92, at 24–25; see
also Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 93 (2016); PERLMAN, supra note
122, at 152 (stating collective bargaining agreements also enable workers to influence the
governance of their industry).
173
Andrias, supra note 172, at 73, 76, 77; Levine, supra note 130, at 566–67 (noting
unions overcome workers’ collective action problem by channeling worker voice, thereby
contributing to a robust public debate to the benefit of the rest of society); Andrias, supra
note 143, at 56. Arthur S. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate
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dignity174 caused by the “commodification of labor” (that is, the notion that workers sell their labor, and employers buy that labor, for
a price determined by the market)175 by facilitating the collective
action of otherwise unempowered and disenfranchised workers.176
“[U]nions differentiate laborers from their tools, because the tools
remain commodities that belong to the firm, but the workers enjoy
self-government through their union.”177 Unions resist commodification and support workers’ freedom by protecting workers from
abuse by their employers.178
Consumer collective action, through an intermediating bargaining organization, may democratize information privacy in much the
same way. A vehicle to channel and articulate consumer voice and
a mechanism for consumers to assert collective control would provide consumers a role in determining their information privacy
norms and the rules that protect them, lending those rules democratic legitimacy. Collective bargaining, in this context, would reduce bargaining costs relative to the cost of (already unlikely) individual consumer-platform negotiations by channeling consumers’
Beast, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 85 (1979); Levine, supra note 130, at 544; Andrias, supra
note 153, at 647 (citation omitted).
174
Work is viewed as having a “special dignity” and value in that, through work, man
achieves “fulfillment as a human being.” Levine, supra note 130, at 550–51 (quoting POPE
JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS (Sept. 14, 1981), available at
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens.html [https://perma.cc/4FMP-XB5H]; see also
Spector, supra note 118, at 1137 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1894 (1987)). Commodification of labor reduces the human being to
an economic transaction, an “object outside us.” Garcia, supra note 139, at 33 (citation
omitted); E. Christi Cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 498–99, 501 (2002)
(describing commodification of labor as workers’ alienation from the “meaningfulness” of
their labor).
175
GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 31; Levine, supra note 130, at 550 (citation omitted);
Garcia, supra note 139, at 27 (citing Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, in THE MARXENGELS READER 191, 308–19 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978)).
176
Spector, supra note 118, at 1137 (quoting Radin, supra note 174, at 1919); Tucker,
supra note 126, at 106, 109 (describing the harm to human dignity caused by the
commodification of labor and Marxian views that labor can overcome commodification
through collective action); GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 57; Levine, supra note 130, at
551.
177
Levine, supra note 130, at 551.
178
See REES, supra note 128, at 182; Garcia, supra note 139, at 33–34, 36 (internal
citations omitted).
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information privacy demands into an overarching set that would apply to all consumers represented by the organization. Moreover, the
bargaining process may further educate consumers on how platforms’ practices affect their information privacy insofar as it is information-forcing: to achieve a mutually agreeable solution, the
platform will have to share more information about its data-handling
practices and the collective bargaining organization will have to
share information about consumers’ values and desired protections.
Democratizing information privacy through a consumer collective bargaining organization would also ameliorate the harms to human dignity caused by the commodification of personal information.179 Much like a labor union, which de-commodifies labor by
allowing workers to decide the terms of their labor, a vehicle for
consumer collective autonomy over information privacy de-commodifies personal information by returning power over the privacy
of that information to consumers. Moreover, whereas individual
consumers lack the power to bargain for their information privacy
with platforms, a consumer collective bargaining organization
would accumulate bargaining power by making collective demands
and threats that may affect a platform’s revenue.
Unions democratize workplace decision-making through collective bargaining, i.e., private negotiations between a union (as a representative of its constituent workers) and an employer to obtain

179

On the commodification of personal information, see Hetcher, supra note 18, at 130
(citation omitted); Baron, supra note 38, at 391; de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1270, 1272,
1278, 1284; Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 11 (citation omitted); Savage, supra note
24, at 98; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2057 (citation omitted); Schwartz, supra note 28, at
1282; Elvy, supra note 14, at 463–64, 466 (citations omitted); Bergelson, supra note 20, at
403–04 (citations omitted). On the dignitary harms of the commodification of personal
information and privacy, see Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 70, 72–73 (citations omitted);
Calo, supra note 9, at 662; Baron, supra note 38, at 390–91, 393–96, 398–400 (citations
omitted); de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1271–73, 1275–76, 1278, 1281, 1286–87 (citations
omitted); Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of
Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 217, 218–19 (2017); Radin &
Wagner, supra note 91, at 1312 (citations omitted); Savage, supra note 24, at 109 (citation
omitted); Post, supra note 70, at 662–63, 667–70 (citations omitted); Opinion 4/2015,
supra note 14, at 4, 12 (citations omitted); see also generally Radin, supra note 174;
Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property
and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993); Cunningham, supra note 174.
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employer concessions to wage and working condition demands.180
The union typically initiates bargaining; whereas the employer may
be satisfied with the status quo, the union seeks employer concessions that would benefit its members.181 A union’s prospect of success depends on its bargaining power against an employer.182 Bargaining power, in turn, derives from a number of interrelated factors:
strike, organization size, constituent cohesion, counterparty resistance, product market structure, and external conditions, such as
public opinion, the state of the economy, and governmental action.
Collective bargaining may also democratize platform information privacy decision-making: a consumer collective bargaining
organization could bargain with platforms, on behalf of the organization’s consumer-constituents, to obtain platforms’ assent to a set
of demanded information privacy protections. The factors affecting
labor union bargaining power provide a starting point to analogize
how a consumer collective bargaining organization may accumulate
bargaining power. Each of these factors, however, must be adapted
to reflect platforms’ distinct economic and structural characteristics.
How much bargaining power will be necessary to countervail platform power is inherently uncertain; the bargaining process will have
to bear it out.
a) Strike/Mass Exit and Secondary Boycott
The strike, and the threat of strike, is the chief source of union
bargaining power.183 Through a strike, the union imposes costs on
the employer by restricting labor supply and keeping resources
idle.184 The lack of production strains the employer by limiting its
ability to cover at least some of its fixed costs and satisfy sale orders,
which can cause the employer to lose customers.185 A threatened
strike may also reduce bargaining costs if its potential effect on

180
181
182
183
184
185

REES, supra note 128, at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 35.
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profits forces each side to reveal information to avoid a strike and
its costs.186
In the platform context, a “strike” becomes a mass exit: platform
users would abstain from a platform until it accedes to their information privacy demands, thereby impairing the platform’s access to
those users’ personal information. Mass exit, unlike a labor strike,
also has characteristics of a boycott—abstention from a platform
also entails decreased consumption of behavioral advertising on the
platform.
In theory, mass exit would impair the supply of personal information to platforms and thereby impede their behavioral algorithms.187 By acting in concert, platform users would also reduce
their substitutability as sources of personal information—recall,
much of consumers’ personal information need not be supplied by a
consumer herself, because it can be obtained from third-party
sources, including socially or demographically proximate consumers.
In practice, however, mass exit encounters a number of difficulties. First, the continued availability of other third-party sources will
make it difficult for consumers, regardless whether they use a platform, to obstruct the flow of their personal information to the platform.188 Google and Facebook, for example, obtain streams of personal information from myriad third-party websites and applications
through plug-ins, cookies, and other tracking tools.189
Consumers would have to, first, know what websites embed
these trackers and, second, abstain from these websites as well to
truly restrict these platforms’ access to their personal information.
And, if a platform offers multiple consumer products (e.g., Google’s
Search, Maps, Gmail, Photos, etc.), its users would ostensibly have
to abstain from all of the platform’s products to affect their supply

186

See MARTIN, supra note 150, at 86; Ashenfelter & Johnson, supra note 150, at 36;
REES, supra note 128, at 34. To a certain extent, unions must actually deploy strikes on
occasion to retain the threat of strike as an effective bargaining chit. Id.
187
Cf. JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS
RIGHT NOW 104 (2018); Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 2.
188
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
189
Id.
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of personal information to it.190 Moreover, if a platform already has
comprehensive behavioral profiles about consumers, it may not
need additional personal information to continue to target behavioral
advertisements.
Second, mass exit’s boycott characteristics support only partially its potential efficacy. The platform would incur a cost from
decreased advertising consumption, but mass exit only entails a
“boycott” of advertising appearing on the platform. For platforms
such as Facebook and Google, whose advertisements also appear on
innumerable third-party websites,191 on-platform advertising may
prove to be a relatively small revenue steam. Hence, regardless of
consumers’ abstinence from the platforms, they may nevertheless
continue consuming the platforms’ advertising on third-party websites.
Third, it may be difficult for users to abstain from a platform
whose consumer product (i.e., Facebook’s online social network192;
Amazon’s e-commerce hub193; and Google’s search engine194) is
ubiquitous. Abstention would impair users’ social and economic
lives, however temporarily. The network effect that props up online
social networks may potentially abate the cost to abstain from them:
if a user’s social circles agree to exit the platform for a period of
time, the individual user faces a lower social cost than she would by
exiting individually because the social network service becomes less
valuable to her during that time. For e-commerce and search engine
platforms, a collective bargaining organization would likely need to

190

Browse All of Google’s Products and Services, GOOGLE, https://about.google/
intl/en_us/products/ [https://perma.cc/T4B4-STXE].
191
Introducing Facebook’s Audience Network, FACEBOOK FOR BUS. (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/audience-network [https://perma.cc/K7PX-87
ST]; Google AdSense, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/adsense/start/ [https://perma.cc/
7L38-L9SX?type=image].
192
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/KF9T-Y8ZF].
193
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/ [https://perma.cc/8CFT-LDPH].
194
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/L8KQ-2ARS].
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educate consumers about alternatives, such as DuckDuckGo195
relative to Google Search.196
Mass exit may not be especially powerful for a consumer collective bargaining organization, but the prospect of secondary boycott
offers some promise. For labor unions, a secondary boycott typically
entails a union’s coercion of an employer’s business partner to stop
doing business with the employer or encouragement of the business
partner’s employees to strike, so as to exert indirect pressure on the
employer.197 Labor law prohibits this conduct, but permits unions to
exert indirect pressure on employers by attempting to persuade their
partners to cease business with them.198
The permissible form of secondary boycott translates well to the
platform context: a consumer collective bargaining organization
may call on advertisers to cease doing business with a platform until
it meets consumers’ information privacy demands. An advertising
boycott would likely directly affect platform profits, which are often
heavily derived from advertising sales. Whether this source of pressure compels a platform to bargain with a private advocacy organization is currently being tested—as of the time of this writing, 800
companies have pulled millions of dollars from advertising on
Facebook, demanding that the platform monitor hate speech more
aggressively.199 A coalition of civil rights groups and other advocacy organizations, under the banner of “Stop Hate For Profit,”
mounted the campaign by lobbying corporate leaders and shaming
a number of companies on social media.200 The Stop Hate For Profit
coalition has demanded that Facebook make a number of changes to

195

DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com/ [https://perma.cc/W2VJ-YXX2].
Organizations such as Restore Privacy compile lists of privacy friendly alternatives to
large platforms. See Sven Taylor, Alternatives to Google Products for 2021, RESTORE
PRIVACY (Jan. 6, 2021), https://restoreprivacy.com/google-alternatives/ [https://perma.cc/
EY2X-G2MV].
197
Secondary
Boycotts
(Section
8(b)(4)),
NAT’L
LAB.
RELS.
BD.,
https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/the-law/secondary-boycotts-section8b4 [https://perma.cc/HDV7-9CGG].
198
Id.
199
Nancy Scola, Inside the Ad Boycott That Has Facebook on the Defensive, POLITICO
(July 3, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/07/03/activists-advert
ising-boycott-facebook-348528?cid=apn [https://perma.cc/QMM5-ER42].
200
Id.
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its internal practices regarding hate speech on its platform. Their demands include accountability measures (e.g., an internal audit of
identity-based hate and misinformation), decency measures (e.g.,
finding and removing public and private hate groups from the platform), and support measures (e.g., enabling users to report hate and
harassment).201 Months into the campaign, Facebook agreed to create a new senior executive role focused on civil rights, participated
in an audit of hateful content on the platform, took down a variety
of hateful content, and began to revise its algorithm to address systemic bias. 202 Stop Hate for Profit’s successes demonstrate that advertisers’ purchasing power can sometimes augment consumers’
bargaining power relative to platforms.
b) Organization Size
A larger union may have greater bargaining power than a smaller
union for a number of reasons. 203 The ability to control labor supply
to an employer confers a significant bargaining advantage on the
union, which may withhold labor unless an employer agrees to a
wage increase.204 A larger union also has a broader fee-paying membership and thus is able to sustain its operations.205 A smaller union,
by contrast, poses less of a threat to an employer because its strike

201

Recommended Next Steps, STOP HATE FOR PROFIT, https://www.stophateforprofit.org/
productrecommendations [https://perma.cc/USN9-S32V].
202
Brakkton Booker, Facebook Taps Former Obama Official As Vice President Of Civil
Rights, NPR (Jan 11, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/11/955750196/facebook-tapsformer-obama-official-as-vice-president-of-civil-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/9GED-38
4V].
203
GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 33, 35.
204
Campbell, supra note 159, at 1016. This can be explained in economic terms as
reducing the elasticity of labor demand. REES, supra note 128, at 70. By unionizing the
entire workforce, a union can reduce the substitutability of non-union labor for union labor,
and thereby reduce the employer’s sensitivity to wage increases. Id. at 70–71; Campbell,
supra note 159, at 1007, 1015–16, 1018 (citation omitted).
205
Preliminary organization, the provision of participatory procedures, and the hiring of
union officers and negotiators, among other things, all require ongoing funding. See
Andrias, supra note 172, at 93–96 (citation omitted). Typically, unions support themselves
through member dues payments and, in some jurisdictions, dues payments from all
constituent workers regardless of their membership in the union. Id. at 93–96 (citation
omitted). Under this financing structure, increased funding flows from a larger number of
members or dues-payers or, potentially, from fee increases following successful wage
hikes.
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may not significantly increase production costs and it has a smaller
membership from which it collects fees.206
Larger unions, however, have certain disadvantages that may
impede their functioning. First, a larger union is more likely to have
members whose wage, hour, benefit, and workplace-condition preferences diverge, thereby impairing the union’s ability to foster cohesion around a common plan of action.207 Second, the larger the
union, the greater the cost to organize in the first instance.208 Third,
large groups face greater difficulty overcoming collective action
problems than smaller groups do, in part because each individual’s
contribution to (and defection from) a large group is less perceptible.209
Large groups have certain mechanisms to overcome these difficulties, such as pursuing core, unifying goals, leveraging an organization already in existence to provide the collective good, “federating” such that the large group is composed of many small groups in
which individuals more easily hold one another accountable, and
providing outside inducements to group members’ participation and
compliance.210 Leveraging an existing organization, such as a national union, allows a particular workplace’s union to form without
incurring large up-front fixed costs. Federation, in turn, improves
accountability because individuals may more easily identify one another, police compliance with group actions, and pressure their peers
to comply.211 Outside inducements, including individuated pressure,
may be positive or negative—for example, group members may ostracize or humiliate strikebreakers and reward those who comply
with camaraderie and friendship.212 Inducements may also be

206

Andrias, supra note 172, at 98; Posner, supra note 118, at 1008.
Posner, supra note 118, at 1008; Campbell, supra note 159, at 1016; OLSON, supra
note 129, at 46, 59–60 (describing a lack of consensus as “inimical to the prospects for
group action and group cohesion”).
208
Posner, supra note 118, at 1008; OLSON, supra note 129, at 47–48.
209
OLSON, supra note 129, at 28, 44–45. But see Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at
441–43 (describing experimental studies which did not support the hypothesis that larger
groups are worse at producing public goods and instead suggested they may be more
efficient than smaller groups).
210
OLSON, supra note 129, at 44–48, 62–63, 74; GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 33.
211
OLSON, supra note 129, at 60, 62–63.
212
See generally id. at 51, 61.
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economic, such as insurance and welfare benefits.213 In sum, larger
unions that employ mechanisms to counteract their potential disadvantages have greater bargaining power than smaller unions that
present employers with a less onerous risk of a strike.
Likewise, for a consumer collective bargaining organization,
large size would confer a certain advantage. Mass exit of the organization’s constituents would impose greater costs on the platform214
and calls for advertisers to engage in a boycott may be more influential. Large size would, however, hinder constituents from deliberating in a traditional manner—it is difficult to imagine how thousands of consumers could engage in a productive and intelligible
conversation about their information privacy. Hence the advantage
of large size comes with a tradeoff; a consumer collective bargaining
organization would likely have to employ less participatory mechanisms, such as soliciting feedback to a pre-determined set of information privacy demands.
The organization may encounter difficulty in obtaining a large
constituent base for a few reasons. Whereas workers may have a
basic understanding that they are underpaid or their working conditions are sub-par, consumers largely have only a diffuse notion of
their information privacy harms. Those who helm the organizing effort would have to educate consumers about how platforms’ practices affect their information privacy to convince consumers to join.
Additionally, if consumers have highly idiosyncratic and conflicting
information privacy preferences, it will be difficult for a large organization to cohere around a set of information privacy demands.
Discussed in greater detail below, an organization can work around
this constraint by limiting its representation to a community that already aligns on a set of information privacy demands or by articulating bargaining demands that are faithful to diverse consumers’
core, unifying goals.
213

Id. at 72–73.
See Spencer, supra note 13, at 901 (citation omitted). As for the effect of large size
on labor unions, a large consumer collective bargaining organization can reduce the
elasticity of demand for personal information by reducing the substitutability of one
consumer’s personal information for another’s. Large-scale collective bargaining would
impede the platform’s ability to obtain one consumer’s data from third parties to the extent
those third parties participate in the collective bargaining.
214
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The grassroots approach has certain benefits with respect to its
ability to amass a large number of constituents. Grassroots organizing would be relatively low cost because it presupposes that a
smaller, highly motivated group would articulate a set of information privacy demands (that is, bear the upfront fixed costs) to
which other consumers would sign on.215 The organizers would rely
on consumers to express publicly their solidarity and petition their
social circles to join. Online social networks’ “federated” quality
support the prospect that such an organizing effort could obtain a
large constituent base.216 Consumers online are not “an undifferentiated mass of strangers, but rather [are in] nested smaller groups
with higher frequencies of repeat play”217 and overlapping connections across groups.218 Within these small groups, reputational incentives (or sanctions) to motivate cooperation are more salient: individuals are mutually identifiable, their compliance is observable,
and reputational repercussions are direct.219 Moreover, online social
networks allow consumers to form and maintain social relationships
despite geographic dispersion.220 This social structure supports both
the emergence of a consumer collective bargaining organization and
the effectiveness of its call for mass exit or secondary boycott because small groups may provide direct inducements, through individualized reputational incentives, to support the organization’s formation and compliance with calls for exit.221
An institutional approach likewise has certain advantages to accumulating constituents. A preexisting institution, unlike a
215

See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 2, 11, 13 (2012).
216
Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1248; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 391.
217
Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 435 (citing Kosinski et al., supra note 163,
at 5802), 438, 441–42 (citation omitted). Repeat interaction among group members
supports compliance with collective goals by amplifying reputational repercussions around
compliance. Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1248, 1283; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14,
at 438.
218
Hetcher, supra note 18, at 121.
219
Id.; Strandburg supra note 22, at 1248; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 396, 448,
450–52 (citation omitted).
220
Hetcher, supra note 18, at 120–21.
221
See Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1283, 1284 (citation omitted); Ozer, supra note 15,
at 272–73 (citation omitted); Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 448, 451–53 (citation
omitted); Calo, supra note 9, at 678.
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grassroots movement, may rely on existing sources of public and
private funding to support its effort to organize consumers.222 Additionally, such an institution may already have members or donors
who would be particularly interested to participate in and grow a
collective bargaining organization. And, as for the grassroots approach, online social networks may support an organization’s farther reach.
c) Constituent Cohesion
A union seeks employer concessions to a set of common demands, but workers may individually hold idiosyncratic or opposing
views on what goals the union ought to pursue.223 Goal heterogeneity may not efface a union’s democratic legitimacy as long as all
constituents are able to participate in the discourse that informs union decision-making, but it can lead to the formation of de-stabilizing factions.224 The formation of factions within a union worsens a
union’s bargaining position by placing the union’s continued existence in peril.225 By contrast, solidarity among union members contributes to the union’s bargaining strength by streamlining bargaining demands and allowing for more effective implementation of
strikes and threats to strike.226 A union is able to increase its members’ solidarity by pursuing workers’ core, unifying goals,227 disciplining members for shirking from strikes or engaging in

222

These organizations already receive public and private financial support, from
government grants, cy pres funds, foundations, and individual contributors. Ozer, supra
note 15, at 250–51 (citations omitted). Of course, branching out to consumer collective
bargaining will entail additional costs for an organization that would take up the cause,
which would require either additional support from existing funding sources or allocating
existing funding to this new endeavor.
223
See REES, supra note 128, at 180.
224
Id. at 178.
225
See Andrias, supra note 172, at 30; REES, supra note 128, at 178–79. Intra-union
factions are typically unstable and end in either the defeat and disappearance of a faction,
or the split of the union into two organizations. Healthy union functioning does not require
members or leaders to be in unanimous agreement—a union may have a sustainable (and
vibrant) two-party system or disagreeing members may nevertheless support the union
because of other benefits it provides. REES, supra note 128, at 178.
226
See also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15, 32–33.
227
PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 202 (quoting A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT,
supra note 122, at 276–77); see also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15.

848

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792

unauthorized strikes,228 and imposing exit costs on members (such
as rescinding voting rights and access to grievance procedures).229
Moreover, a union’s past success may inspire member loyalty that
further strengthens the union.230
No doubt consumers may hold idiosyncratic or conflicting preferences with respect to their information privacy. These idiosyncrasies would likewise destabilize consumer collective bargaining by
hindering a single organization’s ability to, first, channel consumers’ views into demands for protection that would apply to all consumers under the organization’s purview and, second, motivate consumers to participate in a mass exit or call for a secondary boycott
if the organization’s demands are not met. Moreover, multiple organizations that each represent a subset of consumers holding particular views may make mutually antithetical demands.
A consumer collective bargaining organization has a number of
tools to encourage solidarity despite the potential for idiosyncrasy.
The organization may limit its representation to those who already
align on a set of information privacy protections. This approach has
certain benefits and drawbacks. It would ensure the organization
faithfully represents its constituents and encourages constituentconsumers to participate in a mass exit or a call for a secondary boycott. It would also limit the number of constituents, potentially to
the point where their collective action would not pose a significant
threat. Alternatively, the organization can limit its bargaining demands so that they are faithful to constituents’ information privacy
norms and responsive to their core goals instead of their granular,
idiosyncratic preferences. This approach will likely favor standards
over rules, so as to align with community norms, and may involve a
general allocation of responsibility, such as requiring the platform
to act as a fiduciary of the organization’s constituents.231 The organization can also foment solidarity through social sanctions, such as
encouraging consumers to reward their social circles with

228
229
230
231

See Kroncke, supra note 119, at 621, 634, 642.
Levine, supra note 130, at 559; Johnsen, supra note 132, at 207.
See REES, supra note 128, at 30; Kroncke, supra note 119, at 643 (citation omitted).
See Balkin, supra note 35.
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camaraderie for joining the organization and participating in its actions or by punishing defectors with ostracization or humiliation.
d) Counterparty Resistance
Labor collective bargaining is characteristically antagonistic.
Employers are expected to meet demands for higher wages or improved working conditions with resistance.232 Intense employer opposition to a union’s formation may increase the costs of forming it
and thereby impede unionization.233 An employer may increase
costs for a union by limiting the mechanisms or venues through
which it can reach workers, such as by preventing union leafletting
in a factory or prohibiting workers from engaging in union-related
activities on employer Internet networks or email services.
Platforms’ ability to impede consumer organization is of a magnitude more profound and pernicious than employers’ power over
workers.234 Facebook could block collective bargaining content or
bury it in a user’s Newsfeed. Google could demote search engine
results related to the effort or throttle Gmail traffic to organizers.
But, beyond occluding information relevant to consumer organizing, these platforms may have the unique ability to actively manipulate consumer information privacy norms and consumer thought
about acting collectively for their information privacy.235 A consumer collective bargaining organization could provide some workarounds, for instance, by providing a webpage on which consumers
may engage but these platforms cannot impose constraints. It can
also educate consumers on alternative venues through which they
can coordinate and discuss, such as Signal236 or Reddit.237

232
MARTIN, supra note 150, at 86. However, when the cost of union labor is small relative
to the total cost of production, demand for union labor is less elastic, such that an employer
would not face significant profit loss from a wage increase. REES, supra note 128, at 70,
72. See also Posner, supra note 125, at 1002.
233
Andrias, supra note 172, at 30; GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 93-759E,
UNION MEMBERSHIP DECLINE: COMPETING THEORIES AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 5–7
(1993).
234
Regan, supra note 39, at 58–59 (citation omitted) (noting the architecture of platforms
shape how groups may form and the rules around their engagement).
235
See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, supra note 12.
236
SIGNAL, https://signal.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/W5N9-L8AU].
237
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/ [https://perma.cc/6EVJ-H8G2].
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Notwithstanding platforms’ ability to impede their consumers’
organization, their incentive to do so is debatable. Platforms will incur costs to provide consumers with greater information privacy
protections, both to develop relevant technological solutions and to
abstain from collecting and using personal information in certain
ways.238 Nevertheless, they may decide that it is in their interest to
allow consumers to organize and to bargain with that consumer organization. First, a platform may want to support its consumers’ information privacy norms and provide their demanded protections
but find it both difficult and costly to do so because it cannot easily
obtain the relevant information from unorganized consumers. A collective bargaining organization would streamline relevant information gathering by channeling consumers’ demands and representing a body of consumers, thereby reducing the platform’s costs to
satisfy these consumers. Second, platforms such as Facebook and
Google pride themselves on being pro-speech and encouraging civic
engagement. These platforms may abstain from interfering with
consumers’ organization to effectuate these contended values and
boost their public image. Third, regardless of whether a platform is
motivated by altruism or its public image, entering a collective bargaining agreement with consumers may reduce the platform’s risk
of FTC enforcement. A successful collective bargaining agreement
would be a true instantiation of consumer autonomy because its information privacy protections would not be dictated by the platform.
e) Product Market Structure
Some economists contend a union is able to achieve greater
gains when the employer with whom it bargains is a monopolist in
its product market.239 This is due to the union’s ability to “capture”
some of the employer’s monopoly profits, as opposed to attempting
238

See ZUBOFF, supra note 12. Zuboff contends surveillance capitalists depend on the
unobstructed ability to collect and use personal information.
239
REES, supra note 128, at 82–83; Posner, supra note 125, at 1002. An employer’s
demand for labor is less elastic (such that the employer is more likely to tolerate a wage
increase) when demand for the employer’s final product is less elastic (i.e., consumer
demand for the product is not sensitive to a small increase in price). REES, supra note 128,
at 70–71; Campbell, supra note 159, at 1007–08, 1034. Product demand is typically
inelastic where there is no good substitute for the product, as when the employer has a
monopoly in that product market. See REES, supra note 128, at 71.
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to force an employer in a competitive product market to pass on
higher wages entirely through higher product prices, which would
make it uncompetitive.240 A profit-maximizing monopoly, by contrast, may instead partially internalize the increased labor cost in the
form of lower monopoly profits, rather than pass on the full cost
increase to customers.241
Consumer collective demands for information privacy protections will involve some costs for platforms, including lost revenue
from untapped uses of personal information, constraints on their information sharing, or personal information left unacquired. For platforms that operate in competitive product markets, these costs may
make them uncompetitive by, for instance, requiring them to charge
consumers for the product while their competitors are able to supply
the product for “free.” A consumer collective bargaining organization will likely have greater bargaining power when negotiating
against platforms that monopolize their consumer product markets.
Unlike competitive platforms, a monopolist platform may be able to
internalize information privacy protection costs by reducing its profits, but still remain profitable generally. Alternatively, a consumer
collective bargaining organization may have greater bargaining
power against a platform with market power in the advertising industry, which may be able to pass these costs on to advertisers who
already pay a fee for the platform’s advertising services.242

240

REES, supra note 128, at 82–85; Campbell, supra note 159, at 995, 998; cf. Spector,
supra note 118, at 1132. See also Johnsen, supra note 132, at 196. But see REES, supra
note 128, at 84 (arguing that studies showing higher wages won against monopolists may
be of limited explanatory value because unions have also been successful against firms in
competitive industries and less successful unions tend to be in declining or only partially
organized industries).
241
REES, supra note 128, at 85–86. Moreover, in markets where product demand exceeds
supply at the current price, the firm may increase product price, while satisfying consumer
demand (i.e., clear market) without suffering any profit loss. See id. at 87.
242
If advertisers have no good substitute for the platform’s advertising product—that is,
their demand for advertising services is inelastic—they may take on that additional cost.

852

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792

f) External Conditions.
A few conditions external to the union/employer relationship
also affect a union’s relative bargaining success.243 First, public
opinion in favor of the union, including in the form of a consumer
boycott of the employer’s product, can buoy a union’s bargaining
power by making the union’s demands seem less unreasonable.244 A
union also achieves greater success in times of sustained economic
growth, in part due to an employer’s ability to provide higher wages
while maintaining high profit.245 By contrast, an overall shift from
production to less unionized non-production jobs and the erosion of
traditionally unionized industries has contributed to unions’ decline.246 Finally, government involvement and the promulgation and

243

Despite the benefits of unionization, in recent years, union membership has been on
the decline. Labor scholars attribute the decline largely to external factors including the
“fissured workplace” (i.e., the increase in independent contractor as opposed to employee
jobs, subcontracting, and otherwise outsourcing labor), globalization, oppressive or weak
labor laws, and employer opposition to organizing. Kroncke, supra note 119, at 638
(citation omitted); Andrias, supra note 143, at 22 (citation omitted); Andrias, supra note
172, at 20, 22, 23, 30. However, there may be a resurgence of worker organization on the
horizon: Professor Kate Andrias describes in detail a few emerging worker movements that
break from convention and seek to bargain with employers despite the lack of legal
recognition and traditional organizational structures. Id. at 8, 58, 62, 68 (citation omitted).
These movements blend traditional and innovative techniques, such as strikes, protests,
organizing via social media, and providing workers educational materials through
websites, to bargain for higher wages and seek the passage of beneficial legislation. Id. at
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unionization—to influence workplace conditions through a collective bargaining
agreement—but instead seek to strengthen it by bringing more diffuse workers and political
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note 233, at CRS 3–5 (internal citations omitted). But see id. at CRS 4 (noting increase
worker affluence may make unions less desirable to workers). By contrast, periods of
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competition, employers will earn only zero profit even in the presence of sustained
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enforcement of laws that either support or constrain the union can
play a significant role in a union’s ability to bargain successfully.247
A consumer collective bargaining organization may likewise
benefit from some of these external conditions. First, recent public
opinion polling suggests a majority of platform users perceive harms
to their information privacy.248 A consumer collective bargaining
organization, whether grassroots or institutional, could appeal to
these users to promote the benefits of collective action. Second, despite the country’s current economic uncertainty, platforms continue
to experience economic growth, supporting their ability to incur the
additional costs attendant to greater information privacy protections
while maintaining high profits.249 Third, whereas a shift from production to non-production jobs contributed to the decline of labor
unions, the data trade continues to proliferate, such that the value of
personal information to platforms is unlikely to peter out in the foreseeable future. Finally, consumers’ collective bargaining to protect
their information privacy is neither supported nor constrained by existing law or other government involvement; a consumer collective
bargaining organization would not be subject to the laws regulating
labor unions and is otherwise not regulated by statute. New laws
could certainly support consumer collective action for information
privacy. For instance, in the labor context, laws require employers
both to allow union formation and to bargain with the union once
formed. Similar laws could support a consumer collective bargaining organization’s formation and bargaining efficacy. Congress’s
stand-still on consumer privacy legislation, however, suggests such
legal support is unlikely.
247

See id. at CRS 5; Andrias, supra note 156, at 685, 698. Some labor laws support union
bargaining power. For example, employers are required to meet union representatives, put
any bargaining agreement in writing and, though not required to make concessions,
employers must negotiate beyond refusing all union demands. REES, supra note 128, at 29.
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3. Relational Contract
Bargaining democracy is an essential component of industrial
democracy, insofar as it enables worker voice and influence over the
terms of their labor to countervail employer bargaining power. A
collective bargaining agreement consummates democratic bargaining. Labor unions’ ultimate marker of success is an increase in
wages and the improvement of working conditions enforceable
against employers through collective bargaining agreements.250 By
entering such an agreement, a union is able to formalize and entrench a relationship of accountability and trust between workers
and their employer.251 The collective bargaining agreement solidifies the employer’s accountability to its workers by encouraging the
employer to factor worker welfare into its workplace decision-making.252 Employer accountability benefits the employer, as well, because it engenders trust from workers and encourages their general
compliance with an employer’s unilateral workplace decisions.253
Collective bargaining agreements support an ongoing democratic relationship between an employer and workers. They are a
species of relational contract that contain both contract-like and fiduciary like terms. They are also construed according to a sui generis body of law with both contract and fiduciary characteristics.254
250
OLSON, supra note 125, at 7–8. GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 43; PERLMAN, supra
note 122, at 150–51. Scholars have debated the relative merit of collective bargaining
agreements and legislation. Andrias, supra note 156, at 648. Those preferring collective
bargaining agreements tout their immediacy, flexibility, and informality. PERLMAN, supra
note 122, at 151. Those favoring legislation note that it promotes uniformity and insulates
the subject of the law from erosive private negotiation. GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 60.
251
Kroncke, supra note 119, at 649; Moore, supra note 119, at 424, 426.
252
Kroncke, supra note 119, at 649; Moore, supra note 119, at 424.
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Moore, supra note 119, at 424, 426.
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Kroncke, supra note 119, at 647–48 (citation omitted); Posner, supra note 118, at 999
(citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456–57 (1957)); SELZNICK,
supra note 92, at 139. Despite a popular inclination to regard collective bargaining
agreements as contracts, the aim and operation of these agreements defy some precepts
underlying contract law while satisfying others. Id. at 139, 141, 150. Philip Selznick
describes the appeal of applying contract law to collective bargaining agreements as
attributable to the “celebration of voluntarism and bargaining as foundations of labor
policy.” Id. at 139. The law of collective bargaining was to be similar to traditional contract
law in that its chief aim was to facilitate private arrangements and transactions. Id. The
parties were to remain free and autonomous. Id. They were to settle for themselves the
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Rather than simply define the terms of an exchange of services for
payment, collective bargaining agreements restructure workplace
decision-making;255 within a certain sphere, the employer and the
union cooperate and share authority.256 Hence, the parties become
committed to an ongoing relationship with one another that eludes
the voluntaristic, limited commitment, and bounded character of
contract.257 Moreover, akin to a fiduciary agreement, a collective
bargaining agreement requires the dialogic communication of both
parties—an employer may not dictate its terms.258 And, like a fiduciary agreement, law, rather than private agreement, determines
many aspects of the employment relationship and collective bargaining.259 Akin to contract, these agreements contain a number of
specific terms, such as wage rates, paid holidays, safety measures,
and grievance procedures, while other terms come close to fiduciary
obligations, such as those that state the parties’ respective rights and
commitments.260 Additionally, though collective bargaining agreements require mutual consent, akin to contracts, they are interpreted
under the rubric of the parties’ relationship, much like fiduciary obligations.261
A collective bargaining agreement is a similarly attractive device to formalize and entrench platform democracy with respect to
information privacy. Such an agreement—between a consumer collective bargaining organization and a platform—can promote platform accountability and provide consumers a set of concrete privacy
exact terms of their cooperation. Id. Moreover, from the standpoint of the unions, the idea
of contract offered a convenient way of formalizing the recognition won and concessions
extracted. Id. The union was recognized when it became a party to a written agreement,
and the terms of that agreement could stand as evidence of what the employer had granted.
Id. The rhetoric of the times cared little for the difference between a contract proper,
meeting determinate legal criteria, and other forms of agreement. Id. See REES, supra note
128, at 30; PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 151 (citation omitted).
255
SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 141, 152. Selznick describes this restructuring as forming
a “social contract” for a kind of political community. Id. at 152.
256
Id. at 145.
257
Id. at 145, 146, 151, 152.
258
PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 151 (citation omitted).
259
SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 144–45; Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing
Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 218 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014).
260
SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 145; Markovits, supra note 259, at 215.
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rights and protections through a mix of contract and fiduciary terms.
For example, a collective bargaining agreement may call on the platform to take on broad fiduciary obligations to act in consumers’ best
interest with respect to their personal information,262 while prohibiting the collection and use of certain types of information, such as
information related to health and medical conditions. Fiduciary
terms allow a collective bargaining agreement to remain flexible
while requiring the platform to provide more than a bare legal minimum of information privacy protections. They also support the interpretation of consumers’ rights and the platform’s responsibilities
based on the parties’ relationship, rather than consumers’ blanket
consent. Additionally, a collective bargaining agreement can empower consumers to hold a platform accountable by including mechanisms that enable the collective bargaining organization to verify
its ongoing compliance.
Collective bargaining agreements’ limited duration also supports platform democracy; every so often, the consumer collective
bargaining organization and the platform will have to return to the
bargaining table to re-negotiate the agreement’s terms. This ongoing, iterative process allows the agreement to reflect society’s fluctuating information privacy norms and adapt to new technologies as
they are developed. And, practically, collective bargaining agreements offer certain advantages over law—they may be entered more
quickly than a law is promulgated, they are unlikely to attract First
Amendment scrutiny because they are agreements between private
parties,263 and they may be much more finely tailored to the parties.
A collective bargaining agreement between a platform and a
consumer bargaining organization would be characteristically different than one between an employer and a labor union. In the labor
context, the agreement affords both the employer and its workers
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See generally Balkin, supra note 35. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 38, at 298
(citation omitted) (suggesting decisions at the corporate level may provide the best way to
avoid privacy harms).
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Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(2000) (arguing contracts that enforce privacy rights are unlikely to warrant First
Amendment scrutiny because they are private, voluntary agreements).
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rights and responsibilities.264 For example, the employer agrees to
pay a certain wage and it retains the right to make unilateral hiring
and firing decisions. The worker agrees to refrain from engaging in
unauthorized (“wildcat”) strikes but retains the right to engage in
union-authorized strikes. In the platform context, the agreement
would likely tilt in favor of consumers—it would afford consumers
a set of rights and oblige the platform to a set of responsibilities. A
consumer collective bargaining agreement is unlikely to require
consumers to use a platform or provide it certain personal information. Additionally, whereas a labor collective bargaining agreement covers a fairly limited set of interests (e.g., wages, workplace
safety, seniority rights, and grievance procedures), it may be difficult for a consumer collective bargaining agreement to cover what
may be extensive, context-dependent, and nuanced privacy interests.
Multi-service platforms may exacerbate this problem; each service
(e.g., Google’s Search, Maps, Gmail, and Photos) would likely warrant its own set of terms. Hence, a consumer collective bargaining
agreement may need to rely more heavily on fiduciary like terms
that allocate responsibility broadly and somewhat generally, but it
may nevertheless include specific protections when they are ascertainable.
C. Potential Limitations to Consumer Collective Bargaining
Consumer organization and collective bargaining will confront
various challenges. First, there is the prospect consumers will not
cohere sufficiently to support a bargaining organization if consumers’ information privacy preferences are thoroughly idiosyncratic or
conflicting. Second, there is a risk that platforms will not bargain
with consumers collectively absent a legal compulsion to do so.
Third, there is a question of scalability—will a consumer collective
bargaining organization have to negotiate with each platform individually and, if so, how can it influence information privacy protections in the platform political economy more generally? Finally,
there is the risk consumers may be held liable under antitrust law for
engaging in a “mass exit” from a platform as a bargaining chit.
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858

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792

What if individuals’ information privacy preferences are so idiosyncratic that it is impossible to articulate a set of information privacy protections, whether by statute or some other legal mechanism? In the context of consumer collective bargaining, extensive
idiosyncrasy would thwart consumers’ incentives and abilities to cohere, first, to form a collective bargaining organization and, second,
to generate information privacy norms and articulate actionable demands for their protection. These concerns lurked behind labor union organizing as well and, as such, industrial democracy may inform a preliminary response. In the labor context, organizational coherence depends on a set of shared common, core goals despite divergent preferences.265 Individual workers may have different preferences with respect to, for instance, seniority benefits or wage increases versus fringe benefits, but the degree of their differences
ought not impede their desire to join a union and support its decided
course of action as long as the individual workers cohere on underlying, core principles.
In the information privacy context, idiosyncratic preferences for
protection may yield to core, unifying goals and values. Survey evidence lends empirical support to the presence of general accord on
information privacy values.266 Consumers have also demonstrated
their ability to cohere and mobilize around information privacy
when incited by a perceived injustice. For example, in 2006, when
Facebook unrolled its “News Feed,” within 24 hours hundreds of
thousands of users organized themselves (on Facebook, no less) to
protest the new feature.267 And in 2009, when Facebook made a
number of changes that decreased the amount of personal information that could be kept private, 80,000 concerned users signed an
American Civil Liberties Union petition that influenced Facebook
to reverse some of its actions.268 A consumer collective bargaining
organization can, through its educative function, nurture consumers’
ability to form information privacy norms and help translate them
into actionable demands on platforms.
265
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Another potential limitation to consumers’ collective bargaining
success is the risk platforms will not come to the bargaining table
absent legal compulsion.269 The effect of collective bargaining on
profits will influence the likelihood platforms will engage. A number of factors will determine the effect of collective bargaining on
profits. If platforms agree, through collective bargaining agreements, to adopt additional information privacy protections, implementing these protections will involve both production costs to develop and deploy relevant technical measures and opportunity costs
in the form of profits these privacy protections would impede. These
costs ought to be balanced against a few ascertainable benefits: first,
platforms would avoid losses from consumers’ mass exit or advertisers’ secondary boycott; second, platforms would likely have a
lower risk of costly FTC enforcement action because a negotiated
collective bargaining agreement would truly instantiate consumers’
consent; third, platforms’ public image may improve and thereby
foment greater consumer engagement; and fourth, platforms that already offer individuals information privacy controls may reduce
costs by implementing overarching, rather than individuated, protections. Whether these factors will tip in favor of or against platform engagement in consumer collective bargaining over information privacy remains to be seen.
Third, a consumer collective bargaining organization working
toward greater information privacy may find it difficult to scale. If
the organization’s members are users of a particular platform,
whether the organization could successfully bargain with a second
or third platform, or an entire industry, will depend on the degree of
overlap in consumers across these platforms and their coherence
around information privacy norms. Regardless whether the organization can bargain successfully with one or a few platforms, the information privacy protections that result risk being limited in scale
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I acknowledge that the promulgation of laws and regulations could support a
collective bargaining approach to privacy, for instance, by requiring platforms to bargain
with duly organized intermediaries. As explained in Part I.D., rules affecting society
ordinarily obtain democratic legitimacy when promulgated by the government; as such, I
would call for direct government regulation of privacy rather than the passage of laws that
support collective bargaining alone. My proposal for collective bargaining presumes direct,
public regulation of privacy is not forthcoming.
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to those platforms alone. Whereas with legislation or in tort or property law, duties apply broadly to a set of covered entities, in a bargaining setting, the duties adopted apply only to the parties to the
bargain. Moreover, consumers may not be inclined to join multiple,
separate collective bargaining organizations for each individual
platform due to governance fatigue and other limits on participation.
In the information privacy context, there are mechanisms that
can support the diffusion of information privacy protections beyond
an individual collective bargaining agreement. If a collective bargaining organization represents a fairly large consumer base, the
information privacy norms and protections the organization establishes and demands may influence a greater expectation of information privacy among the general public. This augmented consumer
expectation may support causes of action in tort and impel the FTC
to enforce a higher standard of information privacy by finding
“unfair” data-handling practices that do not meet these expectations.
Collective bargaining agreements with one or a few large platforms
may have “spillover” effects on smaller businesses. For example, in
the early 2000s when the FTC began to expect websites to provide
privacy notices, large websites encouraged compliance among
smaller websites by threatening to withdraw advertising from websites that failed to provide minimum protections.270 A platform-consumer collective bargaining agreement can require the platform to
guarantee its business partners’ compliance with prescribed information privacy protections.
Fourth, there is a risk consumers’ “mass exit” from a platform
to incent the platform to provide greater information privacy protections may be a restraint on trade that violates the Sherman Act. Consumers’ collective agreement to make certain demands on platforms
for information privacy protections and to exit if those demands are
not met may constitute a “combination . . . or conspiracy[] in restraint of trade”271 in a technical sense, insofar as consumers’ mass
exit restrains their supply of personal information to a platform—
their trade in data—or their advertising consumption. However, for
such an argument to be successful, consumers’ mass exit must have
270
271
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an anticompetitive effect or an unlawful purpose.272 This will be a
high bar for platforms that are in concentrated markets. And it is
relatively unlikely that consumers’ mass exit from a dominant platform would dampen competition among consumers as suppliers of
personal information, if consumers could be conceived as competing suppliers in the first instance.273 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent in N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co. held the First
Amendment protects consumer boycotts of businesses for political
purposes and thus exempts them from potential antitrust liability.274
In that case, the NAACP organized a boycott of white merchants
with the purpose of securing civic and business leaders’ compliance
with a list of demands for equality and racial justice.275 A group of
white merchants sued, arguing the boycott (alleged as a conspiracy)
maliciously interfered with their businesses in violation of state
law.276 The Court held the First Amendment protected the non-violent elements of the boycotters’ activities and thus state law could
not penalize them as an unlawful boycott, even though the boycotters foresaw and intended the merchants would sustain economic injury.277 Consumer collective action for information privacy likewise
may constitute protected First Amendment activity, insofar as it
seeks a political aim—greater information privacy protections for
consumers as a sector of society. Economic demands, such as seeking compensation for the value of their personal information to the
business, likely would not benefit from Claiborne’s holding; rather,
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273
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they may indicate a “desire to . . . reap economic benefits” by making it difficult for the platform to compete.278
CONCLUSION

Mainstream legal scholarship on information privacy has largely
focused on its economic contours and breakdowns. Information privacy has been viewed as a set of individual preferences and actions
that market forces may optimize. This individualist paradigm, however, obscures the social foundations of information privacy that
suggest information privacy ought to be legitimated politically. The
platform political economy, in which online platforms determine
hegemonically consumers’ information privacy protections and
override their information privacy norms, is anything but politically
legitimate by American-democratic standards. We traditionally base
political legitimacy on governmental or judicial intervention—insofar as they represent the will of the people. Likewise, in the realm of
information privacy, government ought to protect information privacy norms that reflect popular will. However, current law and bills
under consideration delegate privacy decision-making to the private
sector by relying on self-regulation in the form of notice and choice
and, in effect, ratify platforms’ hegemony.
The democratic determination of information privacy is still possible—private governance may become democratic if consumers are
able to determine their information privacy norms and the protections that ought to safeguard them. Industrial democracy theory provides an analogy that can help inform the information privacy’s
democratic legitimation within its system of private governance.
The labor political economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries bears numerous similarities to today’s platform political economy and industrial democracy theory emerged to propose
worker collective bargaining as a private counterforce. Industrial democracy attempted to introduce democratic governance into workplace decision-making through unionization, with the union serving
as a forum for deliberative democracy, consolidating worker bargaining power to countervail that of employers, and entering a collective bargaining agreement that entrenches workers’ role in
278
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workplace decision-making. The mechanics of these democratic
structures will look different in the online platform context, due to
the magnitude of platforms’ bargaining power over information privacy and the structure of social life online. Even so, their application
to the platform political economy suggests democratizing platform
privacy may be possible.
Democratizing platform privacy, based on a model inspired by
industrial democracy, may be a first effort among many to reform
private governance through democratic procedure. Numerous other
rights and civil liberties are affected by platform hegemony, free
speech not least of all. This Article focuses on online information
privacy, both because of the government’s failure to protect online
information privacy through law and because of the striking parallels between the platform political economy and the labor political
economy. To the extent consumers are able to organize, bargain, and
bind platforms successfully, the collective bargaining organization
they form could prove useful to democratize private governance of
myriad other rights as well.

